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Abstract
How can we explain the strange behavior of quantum and relativistic entities? Why do they behave
in ways that defy our intuition about how physical entities should behave, considering our ordinary
experience of the world around us? In this article, we address these questions by showing that the
comportment of quantum and relativistic entities is not that strange after all, if we only consider what
their nature might possibly be: not an objectual one, but a conceptual one. This not in the sense that
quantum and relativistic entities would be human concepts, but in the sense that they would share with
the latter a same conceptual nature, similarly to how electromagnetic and sound waves, although very
different entities, can share a same undulatory nature. When this hypothesis is adopted, i.e., when a
conceptuality interpretation about the deep nature of physical entities is taken seriously, many of the
interpretational difficulties disappear and our physical world is back making sense, though our view of
it becomes radically different from what our classical prejudice made us believe in the first place.
Keywords: Quantum theory; Relativity theory; Quantum cognition; Conceptuality interpretation.
1 Introduction
In 1924, Luis de Broglie, in his PhD thesis [35], made one of the boldest moves in the history of modern
physics. Following Planck and Einstein’s introduction of a dual particle-like aspect associated with light
waves, to “explain” their strange behavior in certain experiments, de Broglie, reasoning in a specular way,
introduced the hypothesis that a wave-like aspect should also be associated with physical entities that, until
that moment, were only considered to be corpuscles, like electrons, neutrons and protons. Like all new
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wild ideas, physicists were initially very unsure about the value of de Broglie’s hypothesis, but fortunately
Langevin had the foresight to send a copy of his thesis to Einstein, who was immediately conquered by the
idea, so that de Broglie was ultimately granted his doctorate. The rest is history: a few years later, Davisson
and Germer in the USA, and G.P. Thomson in Scotland, confirmed by means of diffraction experiments
that electrons could also behave as waves. In 1929, Louis de Broglie was then awarded the Nobel Prize in
physics for his discovery of the wave nature of electrons, which as we know laid the foundations of quantum
mechanics, and in 1937 also Davisson and Thomson received the Nobel Prize, for their historical diffraction
experiments.
The aim of the present paper is to discuss about a more recent “move a` la de Broglie,” which is also the
result of a specular reasoning. The starting point is the new and booming research field known as quantum
cognition, where the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics was applied with unexpected success
to model human concepts and their interaction with human minds, showing that we humans think and
take decisions pretty much in a quantum-like way. This doesn’t necessarily mean that our brains would
be like quantum computers, exploiting the existence of quantum effects at the micro-level, but it certainly
means that a quantum-like behavior is not the prerogative of the micro-entities, being instead a form of
organization that can be found at different structural levels within our reality [26]. Now, if the human
conceptual entities are to be associated with a quantum-like behavior, and therefore possess a quantum
nature, one can introduce the hypothesis that, the other way around, the micro-physical (quantum) entities
should also be associated with a conceptual-like behavior, and therefore possess a conceptual nature similar
to that of the human concepts. However, different from the wave-particle duality, the quantumness-
conceptuality binomial would not be the expression of a relation of complementarity, but rather of a
relation of similarity, in the sense that quantumness and conceptuality would just be two terms pointing
to a same reality, or nature, which can manifest at different organizational levels within reality.
The above hypothesis, that quantum entities are conceptual, was proposed by one of us in 2009 [5, 7, 8,
9, 10], and in the present work we will demonstrate its explicative power by reviewing some of the quantum
situations in which it has been applied so far, among those considered to be not yet fully understood, or
even not understandable. We will do the same for the interpretational difficulties of special relativity theory,
thus showing that the conceptuality interpretation really represents a possible fundamental step forward
in our understanding of the stuff our world is made of, and a candidate for the construction of a coherent
framework for both quantum and relativity theories, and maybe also evolutionary theories [20]. But
before doing so, some words of caution are necessary. From the hypothesis that quantum entities would be
conceptual entities carrying meaning and exchanging it with pieces of ordinary matter, a pancognitivist view
naturally emerges [20], where everything within our reality participates in cognition, with human cognition
being just an example of it, expressed at a specific organizational level. This, however, is not meant to
be interpreted as an anthropomorphization of reality, because human cognition is to be considered as a
much younger and hence still rather unsophisticated form of that more fundamental conceptual structure
constituting the global reality.
There is also no connection at all with any type of idealistic philosophical views, where physical theories
would be considered to be mere theories of human mental content. Quite on the contrary, the conceptuality
interpretation is a genuine realistic view, where conceptual entities are seen as entities that can be in
different states and be subjected to measurement processes, which are processes not only of discovery (of
the properties that were already actual), but also of creation (of those properties that were only potential
prior to the measurement and could become actual through its execution). Also, the conceptual substance
forming our global reality is not even necessarily connected to the human cognition, its existence being
certainly independent of it, i.e., even when us humans, as a cognitive species, had not yet come into existence
on the surface of planet Earth, the fundamental conceptual substance forming our global reality was already
there, because also its quantum aspects were already there. To make even more clear the realistic stance
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underlying our conceptuality interpretation, if the dinosaurs would not have become extinct (probably due
to the impact of an asteroid) and would have further evolved their cognitive talents, they could easily have
been them the first to explore the conceptual layer existing within their species, in a similar way as they
might have also have been the first to discover the quantum nature of the micro world.
Having said this, and before proceeding in the next sections by describing how the conceptuality inter-
pretation can explain different quantum and relativistic phenomena, it is interesting to reflect for a moment
about the reasons why quantum physics has remained so far so difficult to understand, which is also the
reason why so many interpretations have seen the day since it was fully formulated in the thirties of the
past century. The case of relativity theory is only apparently different, as the majority of physicists seem
to cultivate the belief that relativity would be well understood, or at least much better understood than
quantum mechanics, which in our view is only the fruit of a misconception, as we will emphasize later in
the article. A first important point to consider is that the very fact that numerous quantum interpretations
still exist today can be seen as the sign that none of them has been able to provide so far those notions
that would capture, in its entirety, the reality that quantum theory aims to describe, and therefore obtain
a general consensus. We believe that one of the reasons for their failure is the fact that most of them
only try, somehow nostalgically, to interpret the mathematical quantum formalism in terms of classical
spatiotemporal notions.
To better explain what the fulcrum of the problem is, when one tries to understand quantum (and
relativistic) entities, let us use a metaphor. During the eighteenth century, the first British settlers who
landed on the Australian continent were confronted with a totally new territory, both for the uses and
customs of the natives, the Aborigines, and for the mysterious flora and fauna that populated those distant
lands. Among Australian animals there was one in particular that struck the imagination of the settlers.
Every now and then they could see it in the vicinity of the watercourses, but being shy it was difficult to
see it clearly. When they could have a glimpse of it from the front, seeing its flat beak and its two palmed
feet, they probably exclaimed: “It’s a duck!” But then, when it turned around and ran away, they realized
that it had not two, but four paws, and a dense fur. So, they probably also exclaimed: “No, it’s a mole!”
And by dint of exclaiming that: “It’s a duck!... No, it’s a mole!... No, it’s a duck!... No, it’s a mole!...”
in the end they decided to call it a duckmole! (Our little story is of course a caricature). In other words,
they baptized this odd animal with a paradoxical name, obtained by the composition of the names of two
different animals. Such a designation, of a dualistic nature, was clearly only provisional, since no animal
can simultaneously be a duck and a mole, and when they finally managed to observe it more closely and
more attentively, they realized that it was neither, but something completely different, so finally the animal
got a name of its own: platypus!1
The above curious anecdote was used by Jean-Marc Levy-Leblond [46] to illustrate the situation of
physicists at the beginning of the past century, who like the Europeans settlers were confronted with entities
– the microscopic ones, such as photons and electrons – whose appearance could change depending on the
experimental settings, sometimes being observed as particles (moles) and other times as waves (ducks).
And again by dint of exclaiming that: “It’s a particle!... No, it’s a wave!... No, it’s a particle!... No, it’s
a wave!...” in the end they also decided to provisionally denote them waveparticles, wavicles, etc, [32, 43],
i.e., to talk about them in terms of a wave-particle duality. But in the same way a platypus is neither a
duck nor a mole, and certainly not simultaneously a duck and a mole, a microscopic quantum entity is also
neither a particle nor a wave, and certainly not simultaneously a particle and a wave. The waveparticle
dualistic designation is in fact only the result of a fleeting observation of their behavior, and if one takes
1Prior to the arrival of the European settlers, Aboriginal people had many names for the animal, including boondaburra,
mallingong and tambreet. The first scientific description of the platypus (ornithorhynchus anatinus) is attributed to the English
botanist and zoologist George Shaw, whose first reaction was to believe the specimen to be a hoax, made of several animals
sewn together.
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the time to observe them with more attention, it becomes clear that what they truly are is “something
else,” something completely different from the discrete and local notion of a particle as well as from the
continuous and extended notion of a wave, since both of these notions are spatial, while one of the most
salient features of the microscopic quantum entities is precisely that of not being representable as entities
permanently present in space (or spacetime). In other words, we know what quantum entities certainly are
not: they are non-spatial entities (and more generally, as we are going to also discuss, non-spatiotemporal
entities).
However, knowing what a microscopic quantum entity is not, does not tell us what it is, i.e., what
its nature truly is. The same was true for the previous example of the platypus: knowing what it was
not, was not sufficient to determine its nature, which is the reason why a controversy lasted for quite
some time among European naturalists, when they discovered the unusual characteristics of the animal.2
Understanding the nature of a quantum entity is fundamental because the behavior of a physical entity
can appear to us very strange, if not incomprehensible, if we believe it is something that it is not, whereas
its behavior may all of a sudden become perfectly normal and fully understandable if we can correctly
identify its nature. In that respect, it is important to emphasize that a physical theory requires not only
a mathematical formalism, but also a network of physical concepts coherently relating to the latter and
capable of providing a meaningful physical representation of the reality the theory aims to describe [36].
And of course, among these physical concepts the most crucial one is that identifying the nature of the
physical entities the theory is about. For instance, before the advent of quantum mechanics, the concept
of particle (or corpuscle) was fundamental in order to make sense of the other notions associated with the
theory (of classical mechanics), like those of position, velocity, mass, etc., which in turn were associated
with specific mathematical objects in the formalism.
So, to make sense of quantum mechanics, the first thing one needs to do is to find a notion specifying
what the nature of a micro-physical entity is. We know it is not a particle notion, or a wave notion, nor a
waveparticle notion, so, what is it? The standard answer is that we don’t have nothing valid at hand to
represent the nature of a quantum entity, but, that’s it? As Arthur Conan Doyle used to point out more
than once, in his Sherlock Holmes stories, sometimes the best place to hide something is to keep it in plain
sight. And according to the conceptuality interpretation, what has always been in plain sight, but precisely
for that was very hard to notice, is that the notion one should use to represent the nature of a quantum
entity, and make full sense of its behavior, is the very notion of concept ! In other words, human concepts
would not be the only category of conceptual entities with which we humans have interacted: the so-called
microscopic quantum entities would form another category of conceptual entities, much more ancient and
structured than our human ones, and as soon as we reset our mental parameters and start thinking of,
say, an electron, not as an object but as a conceptual entity, most of the mystery of its quantum behavior
disappears, as we are now going to show by considering different physical situations.
2 The double-slit experiment
Richard Feynman used to say that the double-slit experiment has in it the heart of quantum mechanics
and contains the only mystery. Certainly, it contains part of the mystery, so let us start by describing this
experiment to show how it can go away, if we only start thinking of the micro-physical entities interacting
with double-slit barrier – let us assume they are electrons – not as particles, or waves, but as conceptual
entities. For this, we begin by recalling why the double-slit experiment is impossible to explain in any
classical way. The reason is simple: the localized impacts on the detector screen seem to show that the
2Today the platypus is classified as a monotreme: a mammal that can lay eggs, with the male also having a spur on the hind
foot that delivers a venom capable of causing severe pain to humans, and with many other structural differences compared to
common mammalians.
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entities in question are particle-like. On the other hand, the fringe pattern one observes, when multiple
impacts are collected, reveals that what traverses the double-slit is more like a wave phenomenon, able to
create interference effects (see Figure 1). And since a wave is not a particle, and vice versa, the observed
behavior of the electrons cannot be consistently explained.
Figure 1: In the double-slit experiment an electron source fires the electrons towards a barrier having two slits. If slits 1 is
open and slit 2 is closed, the probability distribution for detecting an electron at a distance x from the center of the detection
screen is P1. If slits 2 is open and slit 2 is closed, the probability distribution is P2. If both slits are open, the probability
distribution P12 is not proportional to the sum of P1 and P2, as one would expect if the electrons were particles, but is a more
complex function describing a fringe interference pattern, with the main fringe being the one at the center of the detection
screen.
More precisely, if they would be like small projectiles, then a compositional interpretation of the exper-
iment should be possible, with the pattern of impacts obtained when both slits are open being deducible
from the patterns of impacts obtained when these are opened one at a time, instead of simultaneously.
This means that the probability P12(x) of having an impact at a point x of the detection screen, in the
situation where the two slits are open, should be given by the uniform average of the probabilities P1(x)
and P2(x) of having an impact at that same point when only slit 1 or only slit 2 are open, respectively, i.e.,
P¯12(x) =
1
2 [P1(x) +P2(x)]. But since we generally have P12(x) 6= P¯12(x), even though the electrons appear
to be corpuscular, as they leave traces on the screen in the form of point-like impacts, they cannot be such,
as the obtained complex fringe pattern demonstrates. Note that the one-slit probability distributions P1(x)
and P2(x) are compatible with the hypothesis that the electrons would be entities of a corpuscular nature.
It is really when both slits are simultaneously open that the distribution of impacts on the detection screen
becomes incompatible with the corpuscular assumption, being no longer deducible as a uniform average
of the one-slit distribution probabilities. Reasoning in probabilistic terms, there will be points x on the
detection screen where the probability of observing an electron will differ sensibly from the value given
by the uniform average P¯12(x), in the sense that there will be points of overexposure [corresponding to a
probability overextension: P12(x) > P¯12(x)], and points of underexposure [corresponding to a probability
underextension: P12(x) < P¯12(x)], meaning that one has to correct the uniform average by introducing a
third term I(x), an interference contribution responsible for these overextension (constructive interference)
and underextension (destructive interference) effects: P12(x) = P¯12 + I(x).
Let us now consider the hypothesis that the electrons are conceptual entities, i.e., entities behaving in a
way which is similar to how human concepts behave. And let us also assume that the measuring apparatus,
and more specifically the screen detector, is an entity sensitive to the meaning carried by the electrons
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and able to answer questions when the latter are addressed in operational terms, i.e., by enacting them
through the construction of a specific experimental arrangement. Of course, the screen detector mind-like
entity does not speak our human language, and will only communicate by means of signs that are the
electrons’ traces of impact on its surface, which we have to correctly interpret, and for this we have to
understand what is the meaning that is attached to the impacts appearing in the different positions. Now,
the questions the screen-mind entity is possibly answering, by means of its “pointillistic language,” are here
the following three: (a) “What is a good example of an impact point of an electron passing through slit
1?” (b) “What is a good example of an impact point of an electron passing through slit 2?” (c) “What is a
good example of an impact point of an electron passing through slit 1 or 2?” These three questions can be
addressed in practical terms by having only slit 1 open, only slit 2 open, and both slits open, respectively.
Of course, the electron conceptual entity will then be in a state that depends on the configuration of the
barrier. When only slit 1 is open, it will be in a state ψ1, corresponding to the conceptual combination
The electron passes through slit 1. When only slit 2 is open, it will be in a state ψ2, corresponding to the
conceptual combination The electron passes through slit 2. And when both slits are open, it will be in a
state ψ1,2, corresponding to the conceptual combination The electron passes through slit 1 or 2.
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If the above states are represented by complex vectors in a Hilbert space, one can easily recover the
interference pattern at the detection screen by representing ψ1,2 as a normalized superposition of ψ1 and
ψ2, i.e., ψ1,2 =
1√
2
(ψ1 + ψ2). Then, the probability density P1(x) [resp., P2(x)] that the screen-mind
provides the answer x to question (a) [resp., (b)] is P1(x) = |ψ1(x)|2 [resp., P2(x) = |ψ2(x)|2], whereas
the probability density for x to be selected as a good example of an electron passing through slit 1 or 2
[question (c)] is: P12(x) = |ψ1,2(x)|2 = 12 |ψ1(x) + ψ2(x)|2 = 12 [|ψ1(x)|2 + |ψ2(x)|2] + 2<ψ∗1(x)ψ2(x), where
I(x) = 2<ψ∗1(x)ψ2(x) is the interference contribution, accounting for the overextension and underextension
effects, and the symbol < denotes the real part of a complex number. This is of course the well-known
quantum mechanical rule saying that when we are in the presence of alternatives (slit 1 or 2), the probability
amplitude is obtained by the normalized sum of the probability amplitudes for the alternatives considered
separately. But what we want now to understand is the emergence of this fringe pattern from the concep-
tuality hypothesis viewpoint. In other words, we want to understand the cognitive process operated by the
detection screen, when viewed as a mind-like entity answering the above three questions.
First of all, we have to observe that such cognitive process cannot be deterministic. Indeed, the
specification “passing through a slit” is not sufficient to describe a unique trajectory in space. This is so
also because being the electron a conceptual entity, it cannot be attached with a priori spatial properties.
These will have to be acquired by interacting with the apparatus, so as to give a sense to the very notion
of “passing through.” And since there are many ways in which a spatial entity is able to pass through a
slit, the screen-mind will have to choose from among several possibilities, and choosing one among these
possibilities is a symmetry breaking process whose outcomes cannot be predicted in advance, which is the
reason why every time the question is asked the answer (the trace of the impact on the screen) can be
different. However, answers cannot be totally arbitrary, as is clear that the question specifies that the
3The notion of “passing through” remains a very human way of conceptualizing the question addressed to the measuring
apparatus. Indeed, when we say “passing through,” or even “impact point,” we are already attributing to the electron spatial
properties that it does not necessarily have. In other words, we are already looking at things from the bias of our spatial
prejudices. On the other hand, if “passing through” is more generally understood as a way to express the fact that the only
regions of space occupied by the barrier where there is a zero probability of absorbing the electrons are those of the two slits
(when they are open), then the notion of “passing through” can still be used to conveniently describe the experiment in a way
that our human minds can easily understand. A more general and probably more correct way of formulating the above three
questions would be: (a) “What is a good example of an effect produced by an electron interacting with the barrier having
only slit 1 open?” (b) “What is a good example of an effect produced by an electron interacting with the barrier having only
slit 2 open?” (c) “What is a good example of an effect produced by an electron interacting with the barrier having both slit
1 and 2 open?”
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electron passes, for example in case of question (a), through slit 1. So, the screen-mind will certainly
manifest a greater propensity to respond by means of an impact point located in a position in proximity of
slit 1, which means that the symmetry breaking process will be a weighted one, with some outcomes having
greater probability than others (more will be said about measurements in Sec. 9). Of course, things get
more interesting when we consider question (c), as in this situation not only there are many possibilities
about how the electron will pass through either slit, but also about which slit, 1 or 2, it will pass through.
Confronted with this situation, the screen-mind will thus have to select those answers that best express this
double level of uncertainty, producing an impact point that will be typical of an electron conceptual entity
having acquired spatial properties and passing through slit 1 or 2. And when the question is operationally
asked several times, the result will be the typical fringe structure shown in Fig 1.
Let us delve into the screen-mind to try to understand how such fringe structure can emerge. For this,
let us concentrate on its most salient feature: the central fringe, which is the one with a higher density
of impacts, located at equal distance from the two slits. This is where the screen-cognitive entity is most
likely to manifest an answer, when subjected to question (c). To understand why, we can observe that an
impact in the region of the central fringe corresponds to a situation of maximum doubt regarding the slit
the electron would have used to cross the barrier, or even the fact that it would necessarily have passed
through one or the other slits, in an exclusive manner. Therefore, it constitutes a perfect exemplification,
in the form of an impact point on the screen, of the concept “an electron passing through slit 1 or 2.” Now,
if the region in between the two slits is a region of overextension, the two regions opposite the two slits
are instead regions of underextensions, showing a very low density of impacts. To understand why, we can
observe that an impact in the regions facing the two slits would not make us doubt about the slit through
which the electron has passed. In other words, an impact point in the two regions opposite the slits would
constitute a very bad exemplification of the concept “an electron passing through slit 1 or 2.” Moving then
from these two regions away from the center, we will be back again in a situation of doubt, although less
perfect than that expressed by the central region, so regions of overextension will manifest again, but this
time less intense, and then again regions of underextension will come, and so on, producing in this way the
typical fringe pattern observed in experiments.
Considering the above conceptuality explanation of the double-slit experiment, we see that the wave
aspect associated with electrons (mathematically described by the wave function ψ1,2, evolving according
to the Schro¨dinger equation), is just a convenient way to model, by means of constructive and destructive
interference effects, the different overextension and underextension effects that result from the cognitive
(symmetry breaking process) through which a good (concrete) exemplar for an abstract conceptual entity
is each time provided, when the interrogative context forces the electronic conceptual entity to enter the
spatiotemporal theater, by means of a localized impact on the screen. Of course, this impact should not be
mistaken as a trace left by a corpuscular entity with a well-defined trajectory in space, as it will be better
explained in the following sections. Now, to confer more credibility to the above narrative, and considering
that an electron and a human concept are assumed to share the same conceptual nature (in the same way an
electromagnetic wave and an acoustic wave, even though they are different physical phenomena, can share
the same wavy nature), one should be able to also show that human minds are able of producing similar
interference figures, when subjected to interrogative contexts that confront them with genuine alternatives.
This is indeed the case: human minds, when interacting with concepts, will generally produce overextension
and underextension effects having a very complex pattern, in fact much more complex (less symmetric)
than those produced by screen-minds interacting with electrons (or photons). Let us very briefly describe
an experiment where this has been explicitly demonstrated, referring the interested reader to [5, 19] for
the details.
In the eighties of last century, the cognitive psychologist James Hampton conducted an experiment
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Figure 2: The interference-like figure describing the overextension and underextension effects contained in Hampton’s data,
when the participants had to select exemplars representative of the disjunction Fruit or vegetable. For more details about how
this figure was obtained, see [5].
where 24 exemplars of Food4 were submitted to 40 students, asking them if they were typical (i.e., good
examples) of a (a) Fruit ; (b) Vegetable or (c) Fruit or vegetable [41]. These different exemplars of Food play
here the same role as the different locations x on the detection screen, in the double-slit experiment, with
the concept Fruit (resp. Vegetable) playing the role of slit 1 (resp., slit 2). If the decision-making process of
the students, when subjected to question (c), would be of a sequential kind (they first choose between Fruit
and Vegetable and then, if they chose the former, they select a good example of Fruit, and if they chose
the latter, they select a good example of Vegetable), then the probability of selecting a given exemplar of
Food should correspond to the uniform average of the probabilities describing the situations of questions
(a) and (b). But this is not what Hampton’s data reveal, which contain instead a complex pattern of
overextension and underextension effects. When these data are represented in a quantum-like way, using
two two-dimensional functions interpolating the outcomes of questions (a) and (b), then a normalized
superposition of these two functions to interpolate the data of question (c), a complex interference figure
is revealed, reminiscent of those obtained in the phenomena of birefringence [5, 19] (see Figure 2).
We conclude this section by an important remark. In our discussion, we made a distinction between
the detector screen, playing the role of the structure sensitive to the meaning carried by the electrons, and
the barrier, playing the role of the structure allowing the three questions (a), (b) and (c) to be addressed
in operational terms, when slit 1, slit, 2, and both slits are open, respectively. This distinction is however
not fundamental and was just used to obtain a stronger analogy with our typical human experience, when
we distinguish the mind answering a question from the process of addressing a question to it, for instance
orally or in writing. In fact, the entire structure of the experimental apparatus should really be interpreted
as the mind-like entity, as is clear that not only the screen but also the other material parts, in particular
the barrier, interact as a whole with the electrons’ conceptual entities. So, a more correct image consists
4These are: Almond, Acorn, Peanut, Olive, Coconut, Raisin, Elderberry, Apple, Mustard, Wheat, Ginger root, Chili pepper,
Garlic, Mushroom, Watercress, Lentils, Green pepper, Yam, Tomato, Pumpkin, Broccoli, Rice, Parsley, Black pepper.
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Figure 3: A schematic diagram of a delayed choice experiment, where one of the two detection screens is removable, so that
a wave-like or particle-like context can be created by either leaving it in place or removing it, respectively. The lens element
close to the double-slit barrier makes the wave function components coming from the two slits to slightly diverge, so there
will be relevant interference effects only at the location of the removable screen, but not at the more distant location of the
fixed screen. This means that the latter will not show a fringe pattern, but only two distinct and equivalent regions of impact,
which can be associated with electrons emerging either from slit 1 or from slit 2.
in saying that the structure of the entire apparatus mind-like entity changes depending on the question
that is being asked. More precisely, the effect of asking question (a) [resp., (b) and (c)] is the opening of
slit 1 (resp., slit 2 and both slits) at the level of the barrier, and the actual answering of the question is
the process of having the electron conceptual entity entering it and leaving a trace on the detector screen.
Having analyzed the double-slit experiment, we want to consider in the next section another paradig-
matic quantum experiment that remains impossible to understand if one does not give up the prejudice
that the micro-physical entities would be particles or waves, i.e., spatiotemporal phenomena, and becomes
instead very easy to explain if one assumes that they are conceptual (meaning) entities.
3 Delayed-choice experiment
In 1978, Wheeler considered the following experiment [56]. A quantum entity, say an electron, enters an
apparatus like the previously described double-slit one, with the difference that its arrangement can be
changed at the last moment, before the electron is finally detected. The variable arrangements that are
considered are two: a wave arrangement, like the one used in a typical double-slit experiment, which gives
rise to overextension and underextension effects, and a particle arrangement, corresponding to the situation
where the detection screen is removed and replaced by a second detection screen, located at a greater
distance, so that the impacts detectable on it become compatible with a classical particle-like description
(no overextension or underextension effects); see Figure 3. More precisely, since the apparatus cause the
wave function’s components coming from the two slits to diverge, they will not anymore superimpose when
they arrive at the place where the second (fixed) screen is present, so that the traces of the impacts on it
allow to determine with no ambiguity the wave function component they are associated with, i.e., which
path was followed by the electron, if interpreted as a particle. The experimental setting is however such
that the arrangement can be changed extremely rapidly, and the result of the many experiments so far
conducted is that though the arrangement is changed at the very last moment, the electrons (or any other
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micro-physical quantum entities) behave as if it was present since the very beginning.
Experiments of this kind (see for instance [42]) demonstrate the inadequacy of the wave-particle duality.
As a matter of fact, if the electron quantum entity would behave as a wave (i.e., as a spatial entity
passing through both slits) or as a particle (i.e., as a spatial entity passing either through slit 1 or slit
2), depending on the experimental arrangement, then, when the latter is changed at the last moment,
the electron (assumed to be an entity propagating through space) should have left already the double-slit
barrier region, and the delayed change should not be able to affect its prior wave or particle behavior. This
however is not what is observed in the experiments, where everything happens as if the electron would have
“delayed its choice” (from which the name that was given to these experiments) of manifesting either as
a wave-like phenomenon or as a particle-like phenomenon, until the final arrangement is decided. Facing
the implications of these experiments, Wheeler famously affirmed the following [56]: “Then let the general
lesson of this apparent time inversion be drawn: No phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed
phenomenon. In other words, it is not a paradox that we choose what shall have happened after it has
already happened. It has not really happened, it is not a phenomenon, until it is an observed phenomenon.”
If by “phenomenon” we understand a “spatial phenomenon,” then we can only agree with Wheeler’s
statement, which indicates that we cannot understand the behavior of an electron by depicting it as a
spatial entity, be it a wave, a particle, or a waveparticle. In other words, what these experiments show
is that electrons, and any other micro-physical entities, are non-spatial entities: when the gun fires an
electron towards the double slit barrier, one should not imagine it as a wave or a particle propagating in
space, but as a more abstract entity that is only drawn into space at the moment of its actual detection,
either by the removable screen or by the fixed screen, depending on the final selection. Of course, the
electron exists also prior to its detection, though not as an entity having already acquired spatiotemporal
properties. Again, this is typical of the behavior of a conceptual entity whose state can change from a more
abstract to a more concrete one, when interacting with a (mind-like) structure sensitive to the meaning it
carries.
Let us consider once again the conceptuality hypothesis, to see how the apparent delayed choice behavior
of the electron becomes not only perfectly understandable, but also corresponds to what we would expect.
As described in the previous section, the question that is being asked is: “What is a good example of an
impact point of an electron passing through slit 1 or 2?” An answer to this question will be manifested
either by the removable screen-mind, if maintained in place, or by the fixed screen-mind, if the former has
been removed. These two cognitive entities, however, will encounter the electrons’ conceptual entities in
different states, because of their distinct spatial locations. From the perspective of the removable screen,
which is closer to the double-slit barrier, the converging lens has no relevant effects, so the state ψ1,2 of
the electrons can be conveniently described by the conceptual combination: The electron passes through
slit 1 or 2. On the other hand, since the converging lens produces a relevant effect for the farther away
fixed screen, it will interact with the electrons in a different state ψ′1,2, which can be described by the
conceptual combination: The electron passes through slit 1 or 2 and is subsequently strongly deviated from
its trajectory by a converging lens. These states being different, the meaning carried by the electron in
the two situations is also different, so that the removable screen-mind will answer the question in the way
described in the previous section, with a complex fringe pattern having a central major fringe, whereas the
fixed screen will answer by randomly considering either an upper spot, associated with slit 2, or a lower
spot, associated with slit 1 (see Figure 3).
But why now a central spot is not anymore a good exemplar for expressing the doubt regarding which
slit an electron has passed through? The reason is simple to understand: because of the presence of the
converging lens, and the distance of the fixed screen, the state ψ′1,2 of the electron can now be described,
in more synthetic terms, by the conceptual combination: The electron passes through slit 1 either/or 2. In
other words, the “or” has been replaced by an exclusive-or (xor), conveying the meaning that the electron
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can pass through slit 1 or slit 2, but not through both of them. So, the fixed screen has to answer the
same question of the removable screen, but with the additional information that the electrons do not pass
through both slits simultaneously. This means that a central point on the screen will not be anymore a
good example of the situation, as a central point expresses a much deeper form of doubt: one where not
only we don’t know the slit through which the electron has passed through, but also if it has passed through
only one of them or both of them. Now, since the slit through which the electron passes through remains
unspecified, the only option for the fixed screen-mind, to answer consistently, is to produce a point impact
either in a location compatible with the situation of an electron passing through slit 1, 50% of the times,
or in a location compatible with the situation of the electron passing through slit 2, the other 50% of the
times, which is exactly what is observed in experiments. Using again the Hilbert space formalism, we now
have: P ′12(x) = |ψ′1,2(x)|2 = 12 |ψ′1(x)|2 + 12 |ψ′2(x)|2, i.e., the two alternatives are non-interfering, compatibly
with a classical (compositional) description.
4 Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations
Coming back for a moment to the wave-particle duality, and assuming that an interference pattern would
be indicative of a wave, and the absence of it would be indicative of a particle, experiments like the one
described in the previous section are usually interpreted by saying that the behavior of a quantum entity,
like an electron, is determined by the type of measurement we perform on it. This is certainly correct, but
only if we understand that the determination arises in the moment the quantum entity is actually detected,
and not before, and this also means that if we do not want to abandon a realistic view of our physical
reality, we have to accept that a micro-physical entity, prior to its detection, is usually neither in a wave
nor in a particle state, but in a condition that cannot be associated with any specific spatial property. The
de Broglie-Bohm theory can certainly offer an alternative description here, as it assumes that a quantum
entity is the simultaneous combination of both aspects: a particle and a (pilot) wave [49]. However, if
considered as a tentative to preserve spatiality, the theory, as is well-known, faces a serious problem when
dealing with more than a single entity, as the pilot wave (or quantum potential) cannot then be described
as a spatial phenomenon, hence the interpretational problem remains, and in a sense get even worse.
If we understand conceptual entities as meaning entities that can be in different states (each state
specifying the actual meaning carried by the conceptual entity), which can change either in a predictable
way, when they are subjected to deterministic contexts, or in an unpredictable way, when they are subjected
to indeterministic ones, like interrogative (measurement) contexts, it immediately follows that, by definition
of what a state is, a conceptual entity in a given state cannot be at the same time in another, different state.
We are of course stating the obvious, but this is really what is at the foundation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle. Consider the human concept Animal. When we use a single word to indicate this concept, we can
say that it describes the most abstract of all its states, associated with a perfectly neutral (tautological)
context, just conveying the meaning that: The animal is an animal. Let us look right away at a parallel
between the human concept Animal and a micro-physical entity like an electron, which according to the
conceptuality interpretation also possesses a conceptual nature. Non-relativistic quantum theory does not
describe in formal terms the state of an electron in the condition of just being an electron. We usually
describe an electron in contexts were the electron has already acquired some more specific properties, which
in the theory are mathematically described by the given of a (Hilbert space) vector, or a density matrix.
Consider then the following concepts: Dog, Cat, Horse, etc. They are all specific examples of Animal,
hence, they specify different possible states of the animal-concept, and more precisely the states conveying
the meanings: The animal is a dog, The animal is a cat, The animal is a horse, etc. In other words, the
concept Animal can be in different states and the above are of course still examples of very abstract states,
if compared to states that are determined by contexts that put for instance the Animal concept in a one-
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Figure 4: A schematic diagram describing the localized in space versus localized in momentum (opposite) directions which,
according to the conceptuality interpretation, correspond to the concrete versus abstract directions.
to-one relation with a well-defined entity of our spatiotemporal theater. So, the conceptual combinations:
The Labrador dog named Esmerelda owned by actress Anne Hathaway, Cameron Diaz’ white cat named
Little Man, The race horse named Lexington who set a record at the Metaire Course in New Orleans, etc.,
are much more concrete states of the concept Animal. A concept can thus be in different states, but
certainly cannot simultaneously be in two different states, and some states are maximally abstract, others
maximally concrete, and in between there are states (the majority of them) whose degree of abstraction
is intermediary, like for instance the state described by the conceptual combination: A cat owned by a
celebrity [47, 50]. This means that a concept cannot be in a state that is maximally abstract and at the
same time maximally concrete, and this is nothing but the conceptuality version of Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle. (see Figure 4).
In the case of an entity like an electron, a maximally concrete state corresponds to the electronic entity
being maximally localized in our three-dimensional space, while a maximally abstract state corresponds
to it being maximally delocalized, i.e., to an electron being maximally localized in momentum space. In
handbooks of quantum mechanics, Heisenberg uncertainty principle is usually stated by using the standard
deviations of two non-commuting observables, like the position q and momentum p observables. The
typical result is that the product σqσp of their standard deviations must be bounded from below by
a given value, for instance ~2 . The standard deviation σq has here to be interpreted as a measure of
the degree of concreteness of the state in which the electron micro-entity is, with σq = 0 corresponding
to a condition of maximum concreteness (i.e., maximum localization in position space) and σq = ∞ of
minimum concreteness. Similarly, σp has to be interpreted as a measure of the degree of abstractness of
the state in which the electron is, with σp = 0 corresponding to a condition of maximum abstractness
(i.e., maximum localization in momentum space) and σp = ∞ of minimum abstractness. It is then clear
that the product σqσp must be bounded from below, as we cannot have simultaneously a situation of
maximum concreteness (σq = 0) and maximum abstractness (σp = 0), or situations where concreteness
(resp., abstractness) would be maximal and abstractness (resp., concreteness) would be intermediary (i.e,
with a finite standard deviation). However, the product σqσp should be also bounded from above, as we
cannot simultaneously have a situation of minimum concreteness (σq = ∞) and minimum abstractness
(σp =∞), or situations where concreteness (resp., abstractness) would be minimal and abstractness (resp.,
concreteness) would be intermediary (i.e., with a finite standard deviation). And in fact, a reverse version
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of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations can also be derived, as was recently done [48], in accordance with
what the conceptuality interpretation indicates.
5 Explaining non-spatiality (non-locality)
According to the above discussion, Heisenberg’s (direct and reversed) uncertainty relations should not be
considered to be the result of a lack of precision about how observables are measured in the laboratory,
or the fact that measurements can alter the state of the measured entity (as was initially considered by
Heisenberg in his semiclassical microscope reasoning). They would instead be an ontological statement
describing the necessary tradeoff between concreteness and abstractness, resulting from the fact that, at
the ontological level, quantum entities would be conceptual (meaning) entity. So, the non-locality of a
micro-entity like an electron, which should be more properly denoted non-spatiality, would express the
fact that most of the electron’s states are abstract ones (with different degrees of abstractness), with
the subset of the maximally concrete ones only corresponding to those describing specific localizations in
space. Accordingly, the classical notion of object (here understood as a spatiotemporal entity) corresponds
to a conceptual entity that can remain for a sufficiently prolonged time in a maximally concrete state,
which means that objects (classical entities) would just be limit cases of conceptual entities immersed in
deterministic contexts that allow them to remain maximally concrete for a long time.
A possible criticism of the above explanation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations would be that there
is nothing truly fundamental in our human distinction between abstract and concrete concepts, as is clear
that what we call concrete concepts are precisely those associated with the objects we have interacted with,
in the course of our evolution on the surface of this beautiful “pale blue dot.” It is certainly true that
physical objects have played an important role in the way we humans have formed our language and have
created more abstract concepts, for instance when in the need of indicating an entire category of objects
instead of just a member of a category. So, in this human historical line of going from the concrete to
the abstract, the most concrete concepts are those specifying spatiotemporal entities (objects), like in the
conceptual combination: This item that I’m presently holding in my hands, and the most abstract ones are
those indicated by terms like Entity, Thing, Stuff, etc., with all the other concepts lying in between them,
as regards their degree of abstractness/concreteness (see Figure 5). This human (parochial) line is the
one typically considered in semiotics and psychology, which is the reason why psychologists use the term
instantiation to denote a more concrete form (a more concrete state) of a given concept. This term mostly
refers to the actualization in time of an exemplar of a more abstract concept, like when Apple is chosen as
an exemplar of Fruit, but of course one could also use the term spatialization (or spatiotemporalization),
in addition to instantiation, when the exemplar in question is an object also existing in space. One should
however bear in mind that a human concept, even when indicating an ordinary object, is not an object, and
vice versa, a physical object is not a human concept, although the latter can be put in a correspondence
with the former and the former, according to the conceptuality interpretation, is a conceptual entity in a
maximally concrete state.
So, there is a parochial line to go from the concrete to the abstract, linked to the historical way we
have developed concepts (starting from our need to name the physical entities around us), by abstracting
them from objects, and there is a second line [10], going from the abstract to the concrete, linked to how
we humans have learned to combine concepts (in order to better think and communicate), creating more
complex emergent meanings (see Figure 5). In this second line, the more abstract concepts are those that
are expressible by single words, and concreteness increases when the number of conceptual combinations
increases, so that the most concrete concepts are those typically described by large aggregates of meaning-
connected (entangled) single-word concepts, which is what in our human realm we would generically indicate
as stories, like those written in books, articles, webpages, etc. We don’t mean here stories only in the
13
Figure 5: For human concepts there are two main lines connecting abstract to concrete. The first one goes from concrete to
abstract: from objects to collections of objects having common features. The second one goes from abstract to concrete: from
concepts to stories formed by the combination of many concepts.
reductive sense of novels, but in the more general sense of clusters of concepts that are combined together
in an interesting way, so as to create a well-defined meaning. This second line is therefore very different
from the previous one (in a sense, it is transversal to it), and we humans clearly use both lines at the same
time, when communicating and creating new meanings. However, it is this second line that we believe
is the truly fundamental and universal one, i.e., the one in which the human concepts have found their
natural developmental niche.
The fact that in human language both lines exist and are mixed together can explain in part the
fact that there are structural differences between our human conceptual realm and the micro-physical
conceptual realm, in particular the fact that the latter will generally exhibit a higher level of symmetry
and organization (another reason being that our human cultural evolution is a recent happening relative
to the time scale of our universe). Now, consider a document containing a text, and assume that the
text contains the word “horse.” This means that the story in such document is a (deterministic) context
specifying a state of the concept Horse, which according to the second line of concretization would be a
very concrete state. Of course, this same document can also be considered to describe the state of concepts
indicated by other words in the story, or even concepts whose words are not specifically mentioned but
are nevertheless strongly meaning-connected to its content. It is worth emphasizing that this document,
containing a story about Horse, is not necessarily associated with a physical horse that one can touch and
ride (an instantiation of Horse, according to the first line of concretization). For instance, the text may
refer to the drawing of a horse, which of course is not a living entity, or maybe the term “horse” is only
used in a metaphorical way, like in the Italian saying “la superbia va a cavallo e torna a piedi” (pride rides
a horse and walks back). However, since the document contains a whole story, the latter will behave in the
conceptual realm in a way that is similar to how macro-physical objects also behave.
To explain what we mean, consider two objects, let us call them object-A and object-B. When we
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consider the conceptual combination Object-A and object-B (using the ‘and’ logical connective),5 we are
still able to put it in a correspondence with an object, and more precisely the object that is obtained by
bringing together the two objects, now forming a single composite object (let us call it object-A∧B). On
the other hand, when we consider the conceptual combination Object-A or object-B (using the ‘or’ logical
connective), we are not able anymore to associate it with an object. But if we have two concepts, let us
call them Concept-A and Concept-B, then not only Concept-A and concept-B is again a concept, but also
Concept-A or concept-B is a concept. So, the conceptual realm is closed with respect to the conjunction
and disjunction connectives, whereas the realm of objects is by definition only closed with respect to the
conjunction connective (the conjunction of two objects is still an object, but the disjunction of two objects
is not anymore an object).
What about stories, i.e., conceptual entities that are formed by large combinations of concepts that are
connected through meaning? Of course, since a story is still a concept, and more precisely a concept that
is obtained by consistently combining numerous other concepts, as described by the specific combination
of words that are present in a document (like a book, a webpage, etc.) that makes the story manifest, the
above must still hold: if we have two stories, let us call them Story-A and Story-B, then also Story-A and
story-B and Story-A or story-B are to be considered stories. But the subtle point is in the distinction
between the notion of story as a concept (i.e., a meaning entity) and the possibility for a story to be also
manifest in concrete form in our spatial theater. Consider two actual books, let us call them book-A and
book-B, with book-A containing the words of Story-A, and book-B containing the words of Story-B. What
about the books associated with the two stories Story-A and story-B and Story-A or story-B? Let us call
them book-A∧B and book-A∨B, respectively. The former can simply be considered as the juxtaposition of
book-A and book-B, which means that as soon as two books exist, each one telling a different story, then
also the book containing the conjunction of their two stories can be considered to exist, and to correspond
to the book obtained by placing the two books side by side. In other words, when looking at the shelves
of a bookstore, with the different books placed in them side by side, we are actually contemplating stories
that are conjunctions of other stories.
The situation is different when we consider the disjunction of two stories. In a bookstore, we will usually
not find books of the form book-A∨B. This not because it would be difficult to create an object of this kind,
in our material world. Indeed, to do so, we only have to create a single page having the word “or” written
on it, then consider the juxtaposition of book-A, such page, and book-B. But the probability to find an
artifact of this kind in a bookstore is extremely low, and this because in our human culture it would not
be considered to be the manifestation (the collapsed state) of a meaningful story, as is clear that for two
arbitrary stories, Story-A and Story-B, the ambiguity introduced by the Or connective will be considered
to be too artificial for Story-A or story-B to deserve to be engraved in a concrete document. To put it in
a different way, in general the Or connective in Story-A or story-B will not provide a sufficiently strong
meaning-connection for Story-A or story-B to be able to also appear in a bona fide book that humans
can buy in bookstores. In other words, although in theory book-A∨B, telling Story-A or story-B, can be
easily physically created, it will only appear with a very small probability within the field of our human
cultural activity. The above does not mean, however, that stories that are disjunctions of other stories
will not appear in documents that are part of our human culture. This will be the case of all texts that,
for narrative reasons, require to specifically introduce such an aspect of two storylines that are told one
after the other, with a disjunction in between. A typical example would be that of a detective story, in
which different scenarios are told as possible solutions of a crime. Note that as we consider smaller pieces
of texts, disjunctions will appear much more frequently, like in sentences of the “coffee or tea” and “dead
or alive” kind.
5To facilitate understanding, we will always denote concepts using italic type fonts and an uppercase first letter, to distin-
guish them from objects, which we will indicate using roman type fonts.
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So, different from the disjunctions of stories, conjunctions of stories are in a much more obvious (con-
crete) way stories again, and this difference in behavior of stories in relation to the And and Or connectives
indicates their special status as elements of greater concreteness of a conceptual realm. And in the same
way as objects that are conjunction of other objects need more space to manifest in our spatial theater,
stories that are conjunctions of other stories also need more “space” to manifest, i.e., more pages, more
words, more memory on a computer, in case they would be electronic documents, etc. However, different
from the ordinary objects, there is not yet for our human stories the equivalent of a well-structured spatial
realm, and surely there are many different ways of defining the embryonic structure from which a more
organized and symmetric environment might one day emerge.
As a paradigmatic example, consider that specific collection of human stories that we have called the
World Wide Web. Its interlinked webpages can be understood as the possible spatiotemporal manifestations
of a rather complex abstract entity of meaning (formed by the combination of multiple concepts), whose
full description requires the use of the quantum formalism (or even more general quantum-like formalisms).
This perspective was recently considered in some detail as a way to capture the full meaning content of
collections of documental entities, and the name QWeb was proposed to denote such meaning entity, to
distinguish it from the spatiotemporal Web of written pages [28]. The QWeb, as a quantum-meaning
entity, can be in different states: some of them will be more abstract, others more concrete, the most
concrete ones being the stories associated with the different printable webpages. We can thus consider
the entire collection of interlinked webpages as the equivalent of our three-dimensional Euclidean space,
understood as a theater for those (classical) entities we call objects. In other words, we can consider the
Web’s collection of documents at a given moment of our human cultural history to be the equivalent (or
rather, the embryonic version) of the possible spatial locations that micro and macro physical entities can
occupy, be it in ephemeral or more permanent ways.
This means that we interpret the different stories associated with the different webpages as the equiv-
alent of the spatial states to which the QWeb entity (or some of its sub-conceptual entities) can transition
to, in given experimental contexts, like for instance the interrogative context where a human inserts the
word “horse” in the Google search engine, to obtain, as a result, a story about Horse, among the different
possible ones. Such a search experiment can be considered to be the equivalent of a quantum measurement,
although of course the parallel is not complete, as is clear that search engines like Google still operate to-
day in a deterministic way, whereas quantum measurements are genuinely indeterministic, as the decision
processes operated by humans also probably are (see Sec. 9). But we can certainly consider in our parallel
a future versions of search engines, also integrating in their functioning probabilistic processes (i.e., some
level of randomness), and in any case even today a human is always presented with a collection of possible
results, ordered according to their relevance, and s/he has thus to decide on which of the obtained list of
links to click, introducing in this way an element of unpredictability in the process.
Before continuing with the discussion, let us stress again the double status of webpages: they have
acquired the status of objects in our human world, as it is the case for all human artifacts, but they
also describe complex conceptual combinations (what we have called stories) that correspond to the most
concrete states of the QWeb conceptual entity. But not all human artifacts are necessarily associated with
maximally concrete states of concepts, according the second line of concretization depicted in Figure 5. For
instance, a piece of paper with the single word “horse” written on it, is an entity in a maximally concrete
state according to the first line (it is an object), but not an entity in a maximally concrete state according
to the second line (it is not a story).6 Having said that, we immediately see that a concept like Animal,
6In our Web analogy, we are assuming that humans are only motivated to create a webpage when it can convey a sufficiently
articulated and complex meaning, and that a webpage containing, say, the single word “horse,” will not be deemed to be
sufficiently interesting to justify the effort (the energy to be spent) for its creation, in the same way that we do not find on
the shelves of a bookstore volumes whose pages, except for the cover title, would be all empty. But of course, artifacts of this
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say in the state The animal is a horse, which as we discussed can be considered to be a fairly abstract
state, entertains a strong meaning-connection with a number of webpages, for instance all those containing
the word “horse,” and this means that the conceptual entity Animal is potentially present in all these
webpages, i.e., in all these clusters of meanings that are stories about Horse and which can be selected in
an experiment consisting in finding a good example of a horse story. But since a conceptual entity can
only be in a state at once, for as long as a webpage is not selected, we cannot say it is actually present in
space (and time), as for this it has to acquire, at a given moment, one of the states belonging to the Web
spatial canvas of states.
We thus have here an interesting explanation of non-locality. First of all, as highlighted in many works
even before the conceptuality interpretation was proposed, non-locality means non-spatiality [3, 4]. Our
three-dimensional Euclidean space (or more generally our four-dimensional Minkowskian space, possibly
also curved by gravity) should not be considered the overall theater of our physical reality, but ‘a space’
that emerged following the structuring of the macro-physical entities that grew out of the micro-ones. The
conceptuality interpretation adds however an important piece of explanation, regarding how we should
understand this notion of non-spatiality: non-spatiality means abstractness. More precisely, non-locality
and non-spatiality would result from the fact that the micro-physical entities being conceptual entities,
stories (complex combinations of concepts) can form out of them, with coherence (the structuring element
for their formation) being nothing than the expression of a meaning-connection, exactly in the same way as,
in the human conceptual realm, stories, and in particular webpages, originate and are structured through
the meaning contained in individual and collective worldviews. And these meanings, connecting the more
abstract concepts to the more concrete ones, explain why quantum conceptual entities are always available
in acquiring spatial properties, by lending themselves to be detected by the physical apparatuses that
belong to that semantic space (the Euclidean space) which is a theater for their stories.
Consider a story mentioning an Animal at different places in its narrative. Imagine that, at some
moment, the Animal gets specified as being a Horse, i.e., the Animal concept in the story enters The
animal is a horse state. Then, in no time, it will become a Horse everywhere else in the story, where it was
referred to as Animal, which is precisely what happens in experiments when entities separated in space by
large distances are observed to simultaneously change their states in a correlated way.
6 Objects as limit of concepts
It follows from the discussion above that what we usually call objects (classical entities having stable
spatiotemporal properties) would be nothing but conceptual entities having reached the status of full-
fledged stories, i.e., of sufficiently complex combinations of meaning-interconnected concepts. Again, we
stress the importance of not confusing artifacts containing human stories (like printed webpages) with
the fact that these human artifacts, as macroscopic material entities, are in turn story-like non-human
conceptual entities. The notion of object, as used in classical physics, would then be only an idealization,
as the object behavior would only depend on the conceptual/cognitive environment in which an entity is
immersed. Consider the example of O’Connell mechanical resonator (a small 60 µm flap, large enough to
be seen with the naked eyes) which they succeeded putting in a superposition of two classically mutually
exclusive states, one “vibrating a little” and the other “vibrating a lot” [34]. As another example, consider
the experiment performed by Gerlich et al., where organic molecules formed by up to 430 atoms, with
maximum sizes of up to 60 angstrom, were successfully put in a superposition of states localized in regions
of space separated by distances of orders of magnitude larger than the molecules’ sizes [40]. Experiments of
kind are not in principle impossible to create, and in fact are also created. For instance, in a stationery shop, one can find
notebooks, which are volumes without printed words. But a stationery is a very different context from that of library, or of a
bookstore.
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this kind indicate that also big material entities, like chairs and tables, could in principle enter non-spatial
states. Take a chair. If, at a fundamental level, it is also a story-conceptual entity, then it can be in
different conceptual states. The most neutral one is simply the state expressing it existence, which we
can describe by the conceptual combination The chair is a chair, or The chair exists. Other states of the
chair-conceptual entity are easy to encounter in our human environment, like the state: The chair is in
the bedroom or The chair is in the livingroom. These are eigenstates relative to the contexts where chairs
are usually found. But in principle, and although this may well never be in our reach in experimental
terms, one could also create interrogative contexts, like those considered by Gerlich et al. for the organic
molecules, where a chair’s state would be described for instance by the conceptual combination: The chair
is in the bedroom or in the livingroom.
The enormous difficulty in obtaining in practice a state of this kind is due to the fact that a chair is a
very complex object, i.e., a very complex story, formed by numerous sub-stories, and that to put an entity
of this level of complexity in a state of superposition is about finding a way to decompose such story into
what can be described as the disjunction of two different stories: one corresponding to the chair being in
the spatial state The chair is in the bedroom, and the other one corresponding to that same chair being in
the spatial state The chair is in the livingroom.7 So, to obtain a state like The chair is in the bedroom or
in the livingroom, for a macroscopic material entity like a chair, an experimental setting playing the role
of a mind-like cognitive entity needs to be put in place, able to consistently decompose its meaning in a
way that we would precisely describe as the disjunction of two different chair-stories (without destroying
the chair-entity). Note that human minds can easily create such an interrogative context, when they
express a lack of knowledge about where the chair actually is, and formulate such uncertainty-ambiguity
situation using the “or” connective, i.e., producing a more abstract state.8 This means that within the
human conceptual realm, human minds can easily provide a context/interface that can interact with a
chair-entity in a conceptual way, i.e., put it in a superposition state that they can subsequently collapse,
when some additional knowledge is acquired. This should not be misinterpreted, however, as human minds
objectively collapsing the physical chair, as considered in ‘consciousness causes collapse’ interpretations
like the von Neumann-Wigner. Again, we have not to confuse human concepts with the conceptuality of
the physical entities, and human cognition with the cognitive behavior of the material entities (like the
measuring apparatuses) that are sensitive to the meaning carried by the conceptual physical entities.
So, can we create a physical context able to put a chair in a superposition state, corresponding to two
different locations,9 and at the same time also provide an interface able to conceptually interact with the
chair in such a superposition state, i.e., to understand the meaning it carries and possibly subsequently
collapse it onto states having well-defined spatial properties, as we can do with microscopic and mesoscopic
physical entities? As we said, our tentative answer is that this should in principle be possible, and the
fact that so far we have idealized entities like chairs as objects, instead of conceptual entities, is because
their conceptual nature can only manifest when a context of the double-slit kind is created for them. But
what could be considered the equivalent of a detecting screen for an entity like a chair? We can observe
7The conceptuality language is very fluid: a conceptual combination used to describe the state of a conceptual entity can
also in turn, depending on the context considered, be interpreted as a composite entity of its own. Here the focus is on the
entity Chair, so a combination like The chair is in the bedroom is to be interpreted as a specification of one of its possible
states, but The chair is in the bedroom, as a combination of 6 different concepts, can also be interpreted as a multipartite
conceptual entity, which in turn can also be in different states.
8To conveniently describe the conjunction as a superposition state, the lack of knowledge in question needs to be a deep
one, such that one does not even know if the chair is either in the bedroom or in the living room, i.e., if the chair is or not in
a spatial state. In other words (see the analysis of the double-slit and delayed choice experiments in Secs. 2-3), the “or” needs
to be understood in an non-exclusive way.
9In other words, a superposition that is experienced as such by all the material entities playing the role of minds with
respect to the proto-language of which the chair would be part of, and not a superposition for the human minds experiencing
a doubt regarding the location of the chair, and expressing it by means of the disjunction connective.
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that since our standard terrestrial environment is able to maintain macroscopic bodies constantly in space,
then this same environment can be expected to be able of also producing the collapse – the objectification
– of a macro-entity like a chair in a superposition state. But then, how can we bring an entire chair
in a more abstract state, of spatial superposition? Why would it be so difficult to do so, in comparison
to, say, a hydrogen atom? The answer is simple: for larger and larger entities, it becomes increasingly
difficult to obtain an effective shielding from the unceasing random thermal bombardment to which they
are subjected to, on the surface of our planet, and there is not only the external bombardment: also the
internal environment of the chair needs to be taken into account.
To explain what we mean, we can reason as follows. To put the whole chair in a superposition of
two different spatial locations, we have to be able to describe the chair-entity as a coherent whole. In
mathematical terms, this can be translated into the possibility of factorizing the wave function in a way
that the center of mass contribution separates from the contribution coming from the movements of the
different constituents, relative to that center and to each other’s. Indeed, it is not the part of the wave
function describing the relative motion of the internal components that we want to put in a superposition
state (as this part of the wave function describes the structure of the chair, which we want to preserve),
but that describing its center of mass, which describes the potential localization in space of the chair. In
the case of a hydrogen atom, it is straightforward to separate the wave function relative to the center of
mass from that associated with the relative motion, obtaining in this way a description of the evolution of
the center of mass as a free evolving wave function (see any manual of quantum mechanics). But with a
macroscopic body things get much more complicated, as to be able to describe the chair’s center of mass by
means of a free evolving wave-packet, the evolution of the body’s center of mass needs to decouple from all
internal degrees of freedom, and this can reasonably be done only if the body is cooled down to extremely
low temperatures. How low? Well, low enough to avoid any exchange of energy between the center of mass
degree of freedom and the degrees of freedom associated with all the internal relative movements [55].
One may wonder why these exchanges of energy would be so problematic. It is of course easy to
understand that the external bombardment of heat packets of energy can cause what is usually denoted as
loss of quantum coherence, which within the conceptuality interpretation translates into loss of meaning.
This loss of meaning is caused by the fact that when a physical system is forced to communicate with a
noisy environment, this will consequently blurr also the internal communications, with the result that the
internal components will cease to behave as a coherent whole. But even if the external bombardment would
not be thermal, but fully coherent, this would probably not solve the problem of the blurring of the internal
communications of the chair-entity. Indeed, a chair is a very complex entity, made of innumerable parts,
some of which are more cohesive than others. It is like an environment formed by different individuals,
with different brains, so that even when they all receive the same input, like a spoken sentence (a concept
in a given state), this will trigger a response that will differ depending on the individual involved. And of
course, if numerous individuals are forced to chat together, all at the same time, without any coordination,
producing each of them a different output, the overall result will be an unintelligible cacophony. This is
what we can expect to happen in a photon-mediated communication happening at the level of the different
pieces of matter that form the stuff the chair is made, like atoms, molecules, macromolecules, and other
more or less separated coherent domains, because of the incessant processes of excitation and de-excitation.
The problem of this discordant and meaningless mixture of different communications can in principle
be solved by silencing all the participants, taking away their energy by cooling down the chair-entity to
extremely low temperatures, and of course do the same with its external environment. In these conditions
of extremely cold external and internal environments, also a chair, at least in principle, could be brought
into a non-spatial superposition state, by letting it interact with a macro equivalent of a double-slit context.
Now, considering once more the parallel between a complex entity like a chair and the notion of story, we
can observe that also in our human written stories there are parts of them that are more cohesive than
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others. Take the example of a novel: different chapters, which are like sub-stories, can be distinguished,
and then there are the paragraphs, usually also containing more cohesive and self-contained “units of
discourse,” associated with given ideas (so that each paragraph can be considered to be a conceptual
entity in its own, in the specific state described by the combinations of words in the paragraph). But
going even further, and considering the more specific human line of concretization, we can also observe in
human documents the presence of the “and” and “or” connectives, with the former being usually much
more abundant than the latter. As we observed already, the connective “or” usually increases the level of
abstraction, whereas the connective “and” would typically go in the direction of making the combination
more concrete. Clearly, Duck and mole conveys a much more specific meaning than Duck or mole, as
the “or” is more easily associated with a new possible emergent meaning, not reducible to those conveyed
by Duck and Mole taken separately, and which in the long run might acquire a brand new term for its
designation.10
This breaking of symmetry between the “and” and “or” in human documental entities, and the fact
that, generally speaking, the “or” connective produces stronger connections in meaning than the “and”
connective (compare for instance Dead or alive with Dead and alive, Trick or treat with Trick and treat,
etc.), is indicative of the fact that different domains of meaning exist within texts, where the concepts
belonging to these domains are much more submerged in each others meaning, so that a clustering of
documents in meaning structures of different sizes is inherent in the way a meaning type of interaction
works at a fundamental level. And of course, the clustering process causes an objectification process,
with the larger clusters usually attaining a stronger object status within the governing meaning type of
interaction. And in a physical object like a chair, the same will happen, if we understand quantum coherence
to be the equivalent of meaning in the case of micro-entities: there will be domains of coherence within a
chair, separated from other domains of coherence, which in fact makes a chair, with good approximation,
an entity formed by the conjunction of different parts with almost no meaning connection between them
(no superposition), i.e., behaving almost as different objects. However, their conceptual nature can still be
revealed, if an appropriate experimental context is put in place, like a context where the overall energy is
lowered to a point where the de Broglie wave length associated to all these separated domains can overlap
and start to intimately communicate (for a detailed discussion of the notion of de Broglie wave length, see
[10]). Let us mention here en passant the difference between a dead piece of matter, like a chair, and a
living piece of matter, like a platypus. One can say that the latter, different from the former, was able
to construct, at room temperature, structures with nested domains of coherence (meaning) of all possible
sizes, up to the size of the entire body of the living entity.
7 Entanglement
After what we discussed already in the previous sections, it becomes more easy to explain how entanglement
can be accounted for in a satisfying way in the conceptuality interpretation. Entanglement is among the
better studied and experimentally verified quantum phenomena, and one that appears to defy our common
(spatial) sense, which is the reason why Einstein famously described entanglement as a “spooky action
at a distance.” Indeed, the possibility of creating a condition of entanglement between two micro-entities
appears not to depend on the spatial distance separating them or, to put it in more precise terms, appears
not to depend on the spatial distance between the locations where the entangled entities can be detected
with high probability. A characteristic of quantum entanglement (a direct consequence of the superposition
10The effects of the “and” and “or” conjunctions as regards making a combination more or less abstract is in fact much
more articulated; see for instance the discussions in [8, 10].
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principle) is that it is ubiquitous,11 in the sense that quantum entities naturally entangle whenever they
are allowed to interact and will typically remain entangled for as long as nothing intervenes to disentangle
them (to decohere them). This ubiquitousness of entanglement mirrors the ubiquitousness of the meaning-
connections that are unavoidably present in any conceptual realm. As soon as two conceptual entities are
allowed to meet in a given cognitive context, a meaning-connection will exist between them, whose strength
will of course depend on how much meaning the two entities can share and exchange.
Take the example of the two concepts Animal and Acts. These are two abstract concepts that are quite
strongly meaning-connected in most contexts, as we all know from our experience of the world that animals
are living beings and that living beings can do different types of actions, and that there are actions that
certain animals will typically do that other animals will not do. This connection becomes perfectly evident
when these two concepts are combined in a sentence like The animal acts. Almost all human minds will
agree that such sentence possesses a full and perfectly understandable meaning. To better understand the
nature of this meaning-connection between Animal and Acts, when combined as The animal acts, we can
consider two couples of exemplars for both concepts, like the following ones [24]: (Horse, Bear) and (Tiger,
Cat) for Animal, and let us denote these two couples A and A′, respectively, then (Growls, Whinnies) and
(Snorts, Meows), for Acts, and let us denote them B and B′, respectively. One can then invite a certain
number of individuals to participate in the following coincidence experiment. Considering the combination
The animal acts, they are asked to select pairs of exemplars for these two concepts, as representative
examples of their combination. If they choose from the couples A and B, their selection will be considered
to be the outcome of a joint measurement denoted AB, and similarly for the other combinations, thus
defining in total four joint measurements: AB, A′B, AB′ and A′B′. The statistics of all these outcomes
can then be analyzed in the same way physicists analyze data of Bell-test experiments, for instance using
that version of Bell’s inequality known as the Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt (CHSH) inequality [33].12
And the result is that the inequality will be violated with magnitudes similar to those of typical laboratory
physics’ situations with entangled spins or entangled photons [24, 25].
So, the conceptual combination The Animal Acts describes what in physics is considered to be an
entangled state. Such combination contains both a specification of the state of Animal and of the state of
Acts, but also a specification of the “state of their connection.” Indeed, if instead of The animal acts we
would have used the more complex combination An animal that has been doped acts in a strange way, not
only the specification of the states of Animal and Acts would be different, but also their meaning connection,
in that context, would be different. This however is not how one would usually interpret an entangled state
in quantum mechanics. Indeed, since genuine quantum states are only assumed to be described by pure
states, and one cannot associate pure states to the different components of a composite entity when they
are entangled, the usual conclusion is that when a composite entity is in an entangled state, its components
cease to exist, in the same way as two water droplets also cease to exist when they are fused into a single
larger droplet. This however is not fully consistent with the observation that entanglement preserves the
structure of the composite entity. For instance, two entangled electrons, when disentangled, will still
have the same mass and electric charge. In other words, quantum entities certainly do not completely
disappear when entangled, as the conceptual combination The animal acts, interpreted as an entangled
states, also indicates. So, do we have an incompatibility between the conceptuality interpretation and what
the standard quantum formalism indicates? Surely not, though the conceptuality interpretation certainly
pushes us towards a completion of the quantum formalism, to also allow the components of an entangled
11This explains why standard quantum mechanics cannot consistently describe separated physical systems [1]; see also Sec. 3
of [10].
12The CHSH inequality is |S| ≤ 2, with S ≡ E(A,B) − E(A,B′) + E(A′, B) + E(A′, B′), where E(A,B) denotes the
expectation value for the joint measurement AB, given by: E(A,B) = p(A1, B1) − p(A1, B2) − p(A2, B1) + p(A2, B2), with
p(A1, B1) the probability for obtaining the pair of outcomes (A1, B1), i.e., (Horse, Growls), corresponding to the combination
The horse growls, and similarly for the other probabilities and joint measurements.
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Figure 6: When two disconnected dice are jointly rolled, there are 36 equiprobable pairs of upper face-outcomes (no correla-
tions). But if the two dice are connected through a rigid rod, when they are rolled only 4 pairs of upper face-outcomes can be
obtained (correlations are created by the rolling experiment.
system to remain in well-defined states. This can be done by adopting the recently derived extended
Bloch representation (EBR) of quantum mechanics [12], where one can consistently represent the state of a
bipartite composite entity as a triple of (real) vectors, with two of them specifying the individual states of
the two components and the third one (of higher dimensionality) the state of their connection [16, 17]. The
reason why the extended Bloch representation can do so is that it is a completed version of the quantum
formalism, where density operators also play a role as representatives of genuine states, so that one no
longer needs to give up the general principle saying that a composite system exists, and therefore is in a
well-defined state, if and only if its components also exist, and therefore are in well-defined states (see also
Sec. 9, for the role played by the EBR in relation to the measurement problem).
As soon as we explain entanglement as a meaning-connection, the phenomen is demystified. First of
all, because it becomes clear that there are no communications through space that should be associated
with the quantum correlations, as a meaning-connection between two concepts is an abstract element of
reality, not manifesting at the level of our spatial theater. And it is also clear that although it is correct
to describe an entangled system, like two entangled electrons, as a whole, because of the presence of
the meaning-connection playing the role of a connective element, not for this one should think that the
conceptual entities would have lost their identity in the combination (in a nutshell, entanglement, as an
emergent phenomenon, is not “1 + 1 → 1,” but “1 + 1 → 3”). And once one considers the role played by
this connecting element, it becomes evident that when individual properties are created (instead of just
discovered) in a coincidence measurement, also correlations will be created (instead of just discovered),
precisely because of the presence of a non-spatial (more abstract) connection. In other words, it is because
correlations are created in a joint measurement (called correlations of the second kind [2, 17]), instead of
just discovered, that Bell’s inequalities can be violated, and the only way to create correlations out of a
composite entity is to have the components to be connected prior to the measurement.
To help better understand what we mean by this, consider two traditional dice. If we roll them at the
same time, we will obtain 36 possible and equiprobable pairs of upper face-outcomes. This is a situation
where no correlations can be detected in the statistics of outcomes. However, if we connect the dice through
a rigid rod, then only certain couples of upper faces can be obtained, when they are jointly rolled, and not
others (see Figure 6). In this example, we can perfectly see the role played by the connecting element, here
perfectly visible as a connection through space, and composite interconnected macro-systems of this kind
can easily violate Bell’s inequalities [53]. The connection through meaning plays exactly the same role of
the rigid rod connecting the two dice through space. Of course, it will not work in such a stable way, when
human minds select couples of exemplars representative of more abstract concepts, as fluctuations are also
expected to be present. Remaining within the paradigm of the dice example, a more realistic description
would be that of a rigid rod having a probability of also detaching and falling during the execution of the
joint rolling process, so that correlations will not be always perfect, which is something that will typically
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lower the degree of violation of Bell’s inequalities [54].
To complete our discussion, let us also give the example of a conceptual situation that would be the
equivalent of two micro-entities in a non-entangled (product) state, like two disconnected dice. Consider
the conceptual combination The animal is a cat whose favorite act is to meow. Since such combination
already actualizes a connection between Cat and Meow, the process of creating correlations during the
joint measurement will be considerably reduced. In other words, we are here in a situation of correlations
of the first kind [2, 17], which will be typically discovered instead of created during the experiment.
More examples could be provided of human conceptual situations mimicking what happens in entangled
micro-system, when interpreted as conceptual meaning-connected systems. A quite suggestive cognitive
psychology experiment was for instance recently performed, where participants were asked to select pairs
of wind directions they considered to be good representatives of Two different wind directions, with the
data showing a violation of the CHSH inequality of magnitude close to that of experiments with entangled
spins [29]. A symmetrized version of the experiment was also considered, which received a complete
quantum modeling in Hilbert space, using a singlet state to describe the meaning-connection and product
measurements to describe the interrogative context where couples of actual wind directions were selected
[30].
Let us use this last example of wind directions to make it even more explicit the parallel between
the nature and behavior of conceptual and micro-physical entities. When we consider the conceptual
combination Two different wind directions, none of the two winds concepts in it has a spatial direction. In
the same way, considering two spin-12 quantum entity in a singlet (entangled) state, also in this situation
the two spins have no spatial direction. These are only acquired when the two spin entities are forced by
the measuring apparatus to acquire one, in the same way that participants to the cognitive experiment are
forced to choose actual couples of wind directions. The way they do so depends on the accumulated human
experience with winds blowing on the surface of our planet, and the meaning that was abstracted from
these experiences. This will cause certain wind directions to be perceived as more different than others,
thus favoring a process of creation of strong correlations during the selection of pairs of spatial directions
that are judged be the best examples of Two different wind directions. This is exactly what also happens
in coincidence experiments with two spin-12 entities in a singlet state, which is a state of zero spin where
specific directions (eigenstates of the spin operators) have not yet been created. So, when the mind-like
Stern-Gerlach apparatuses jointly select a spin direction, i.e., when they answer the question “What is
the best example of two different spin directions?” they will produce an answer taking into account the
meaning content carried by the composite conceptual spin entity, which can be described by the conceptual
combination The total spin value is zero or, to express it in even more specific terms: Spin orientations
are always opposite when they are created along a same direction.
8 Indistinguishability
In the previous section, we explained that entanglement, according to the conceptuality interpretation, is
the expression of a meaning-connection between conceptual entities. Sometimes, entanglement is described
as quantum coherence, where the term “coherence” is to be understood as a given, fixed relation between
states, which is precisely what an entangled state is: a fixed relation between product states expressed
by means of their superposition. This relation, or connection, is a meaning-connection existing before
the entangled entities are subjected to possible interrogative contexts. So, realism is clearly not at stake
when dealing with entanglement, as reality, as we explained already, would not be fully contained in the
spatiotemporal theater and entangled quantum entities would be entities in more abstract states, available
to acquire spatial properties (like locations and directions) only when submitted to suitable contexts, like
the measurement ones. In other words, we have to distinguish what connects entities, and the effects
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that these connections produce in terms of correlations that can be created in the laboratories, which are
processes where more concrete exemplars/instantiations of abstract concepts can be jointly actualized.
In this section, we want to address another of the quantum conundrums, indistinguishability, and
explain why it can be convincingly elucidated by the conceptuality interpretation; this because concepts
have a built-in notion of indistinguishability, which is apparently what we also use by default when we
deal with large collections of concepts [5, 27]. But before that, let us briefly recall what the notion of
indistinguishability is about. Two entities – let us call them S1 and S2 – are said to be distinguishable
if when we exchange their role this can have observable effects, at least in principle. Entities that are
indistinguishable are said to be identical, and identical means that they possess exactly the same set of
attributes, i.e., the same set of state-independent intrinsic properties, like for instance a same mass, charge
and spin, as it is the case for all elementary micro-entities, for example electrons. Now, identical entities,
although indistinguishable, are nevertheless individuals. This is precisely because they have attributes that
can be measured and used to count how many of them are present in a composite system. For instance, the
electric charge of a collection of electrons, if measured, will be Ne, with e the charge of a single electron and
N an integer number indicating the number of identical electrons that are present in the collection. Hence,
identical individuals are not necessarily a same individual, i.e., what renders two entities distinguishable
appears not to be what also confers them their individuality.
Indistinguishability has profound consequences on the statistical behavior of identical entities, when
considered collectively. Consider first the case where S1 would be in some way distinguishable from S2, and
assume for simplicity that they can only be in two different states, let us call them ψ1 and ψ2. Then, the
two entities, when considered as a composite system formed by two non-interacting sub-entities, can be in 4
different states [see Figure 7(a)]: one where both entities are in state ψ1, one where both entities are in state
ψ2, one where S1 is in state ψ1 and S2 is in state ψ2, and finally one where S1 is in state ψ2 and S2 is in state
ψ2. In the more general case where the number of distinguishable entities is n and the number of states they
can be in is m, it is not difficult to see that the total number N of states of the composite system formed by
n non-interacting sub-entities is: NMB = m
n, where the subscript “MB” stands for “Maxwell-Boltzmann,”
as this way of counting is characteristic for the classical Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics.
But consider now the situation where the two entities are indistinguishable. In this case, the situation
where S1 is in state ψ1 and S2 is in state ψ2, and the situation where S1 is in state ψ2 and S2 is in
state ψ1, cannot anymore be distinguished, hence they correspond to the same situation, which means
that now we only have a total of 3 different states [see Figure 7(b)]. Again, a formula can be written for
the general case: NBE =
(
n+m−1
n
)
= (n+m−1)!n!(m−1)! , where the subscript “BE” stands for “Bose-Einstein,” as
this way of counting is characteristic for the quantum Bose-Einstein statistics. For completeness, let us
also describe a third situation, where not only the two entities are indistinguishable, but there is also the
constraint that they cannot be jointly in the same state (Pauli’s exclusion principle). Then only a single
state remains for the composite system [see Figure 7(c)], and for the general situation we have the formula:
NFD =
(
m
n
)
= m!n!(m−n)! , where the subscript “FD” stands for “Fermi-Dirac,” as this way of counting is
characteristic for the quantum Fermi-Dirac statistics.
If the conceptuality interpretation correctly captures the nature of quantum entities, then quantum
indistinguishability should appear also in the ambit of the human conceptual realm, at least to some
extent, and produce non-classical statistics, not deducible from the MB way of counting states. Let us take
the example of the abstract concept Animal. We can consider a certain number of these Animal concepts,
say ten of them. A collection of this kind can be described by considering the two-concept combination:
Ten animals. It is then clear that all the Animal concepts in the combination are completely identical
and all exactly in the same state, i.e., all carrying exactly the same meaning, and that we are truly in
the presence of a collection of entities, not of a single one. In other words, in the conceptual combination
Ten animals the quantum indistinguishability becomes perfectly self-evident, so that the conceptuality
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Figure 7: The total number of states for two entities that can be in two different states, ψ1 and ψ2, when (a) they are distin-
guishable (spatial objects); (b) they are indistinguishable and can be in the same state (bosons); (c) they are indistinguishable
but cannot be in the same state (fermions).
interpretation offers a very simple and clear explanation of it. This would not possible for spatial objects,
as is clear that two spatial objects are never indistinguishable, as they always occupy different locations
in space, i.e., they are always in different spatial states. They can in principle all have the same intrinsic
properties, but because of their spatiotemporal status they will always be distinguishable. So, the fact that
Ten animals is a concept, and not an object, is crucial for it being able to carry the quantum feature of
‘being many and at the same time being genuinely indistinguishable’.
Let us consider then two possible exemplars of Animal : Cat and Dog. These are to be considered as
two possible states of Animal, i.e., the states expressing the meaning that The animal is a cat and The
animal is a dog, respectively. We are thus in the situation where m = 2 and n = 10, so that NBE = 11.
More specifically, the eleven states that the concept Ten animals can be in, when only the two exemplars
Cat and Dog are considered, are: ψ10,0 = Ten cats, ψ9,1 = Nine cats and one dog, ψ8,2 = Eight cats and
two dogs, . . . , ψ2,8 = Two cats and eight dogs, ψ1,9 = One cat and nine dogs and ψ0,10 = Ten dogs. If we
assume that the Cat and Dog states can be actualized with the same probability and that there are no
ways to distinguish between the individual cats, nor between the individual dogs, then the probabilities for
obtaining all these states are the same, and given by PBE(ψ10−i,i) = 111 , i = 0, . . . , 10. On the other hand, in
case there would be an underlying reality allowing to make further distinctions, then all these states would
have a multiplicity. More precisely, the multiplicity of the state ψ10−i,i is 10!i!(10−i)! , which gives the MB
probabilities: PMB(ψ10−i,i) = 10!i!(10−i)!210 , i = 0, . . . , 10. More specifically: PMB(ψ10,0) = PMB(ψ0,10) =
1
1024 ,
PMB(ψ9,1) = PMB(ψ1,9) =
5
512 , PMB(ψ8,2) = PMB(ψ2,8) =
45
1025 , PMB(ψ7,3) = PMB(ψ3,7) =
15
128 , PMB(ψ6,4) =
PMB(ψ4,6) =
105
512 , PMB(ψ5,5) =
63
256 .
Can we find evidence for a deviation from the MB statistics to the BE one, due to the indistinguishability
of the individual Animal concepts in the combination Ten animals? A possibility is to view the Web as
a mind-like entity that can tell different stories, associated with all its searchable webpages. In this way,
one can perform counts, using a search engine like Google, and use the obtained numbers as an estimate of
the different probabilities (see [28] for more details about this way of interrogating the Web). When doing
so, however, it is important to exclude the two extremal states ψ10,0 = Ten cats and ψ0,10 = Ten dogs, as
these combinations will obtain counts that are two orders of magnitude greater than all the others, and
this because the sentence “ten cats” (resp., “ten dogs”) does not contain the “dog” (resp., “cat”) word,
and can thus easily combine with all possible other words. Furthermore, if we would use the more specific
combination “ten cats and zero dogs” (resp., “ten dogs and zero cats”), we would obtain no counts, as we
don’t usually express things in this way in conventional human language. Thus, our Web interrogation
will not provide correct data for the two states ψ10,0 and ψ0,10, which therefore must be dropped from the
statistics. This means that we only start counting the number of pages containing the combinations “nine
cats and one dog” or “one dog and nine cats.” On August 20, 2017, Google gives: N9,1 = 3090. Doing the
same for the combinations “eight cats two dogs” or “two dogs and eight cats,” we obtain: N8,2 = 4790, and
proceeding in the same way, we find: N7,3 = 2580, N6,4 = 7390, N5,5 = 4460, N4,6 = 3310, N3,7 = 5020,
N2,8 = 3710, N1,9 = 2980. With N = N9,1 +N8,2 + · · ·+N1,9 = 37330, we can thus calculate the weights
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Figure 8: A comparison of the Maxwell-Boltzmann (PMB) and BE (PBE) probabilities with those obtained by performing
Google’s counts (on August 18, 2017) on the Web (P ), in the situation where the conceptual entitiy Ten animals is considered
in relation to the two exemplar-states Cat and Dog. Note that the extremal states Ten cats and Ten dogs were not considered
in the calculation.
P (ψ10−i,i) =
N(10−i,i)
N , i = 1, . . . , 9, and interpret them as the experimental probabilities for the states
ψ10−i,i, i = 1, . . . , 9. These are: P (ψ9,1) = 0.083, P (ψ8,2) = 0.128, P (ψ7,3) = 0.069, P (ψ6,4) = 0.198,
P (ψ5,5) = 0.119, P (ψ4,6) = 0.089, P (ψ3,7) = 0.134, P (ψ2,8) = 0.099 and P (ψ1,9) = 0.080. In Figure 8,
we represent them together with the theoretical MB (PMB) and BE (PBE) probabilities (after having
renormalized them, following the cut off of the extremal states). Clearly, the data obtained from the
counts are much more typical of a BE statistics, with some added fluctuations, than a classical MB one.13
Of course, Google’s counts are far from being a precise estimate of the actual number of existing
webpages containing specific combination of words, which means that the above is to be only considered
as an illustrative example, more than a demonstrative one. More examples of Web counts can be found
in [5, 27]. But more importantly, in [27] experiments on human subjects were also performed. More
precisely, 88 participants were given a list of concepts, like Eleven animals, Nine humans, Eight expressions
of emotion, etc., in association with two of their possible exemplars, like Cat and Dog for Animal, Man
and Woman for Human, Laugh and Cry for Expression of emotion, etc. More precisely, different numerical
combinations of exemplars were each time presented to them, for each one of the concepts, asking them to
evaluate what are the most probable combinations, according to their preference. The obtained result show
that the passage from the BE statistics (corresponding to a perception of strict indistinguishability of the
concepts) to a classical MB one, depends on the concepts and exemplars considered in the experiment, in
the sense that the easier it is to relate them to everyday life situations, and the more the obtained statistics
will tend towards the MB one. On the other hand, the less the human imagination is influenced by real
life situations (where MB statistics dominates) and can run free, the more the BE statistics will appear.
What about the Fermi-Dirac (FD) statistics, can we also find traces of it in the human conceptual
realm? We can observe that the interfaces with which the human concepts interact, i.e., the memory
structures sensitive to their meanings, are certainly organized according to Pauli’s exclusion principle.
Take the simple example of a computer, which will not allow one to make a copy of a file and name it in
the same way, if memorized in the same folder. So, we can have identical copies of a same concept, but
13Note that these fluctuations are really such, in the sense that the deviations from the Bose-Einstein “flat line” will be
generally different when different concepts are considered, say for instance Horse and Cow instead of Cat and Dog, to stay
on animals. In other words, the observed deviations from the Bose-Einstein statistics cannot be generally attributed to a
systematic classical multiplicity of the states.
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these identical copies must be in different states within the memory (in different folders in the computer).
But we also know that entities formed by ordinary (baryonic) matter, which according to the conceptuality
interpretation are the cognitive/memory-like entities interfacing with the bosonic messengers, are made of
elementary fermions. So, one would expect to be also able to identify the equivalent of these fermionic
elementary entities within our human conceptual realm. Consider for instance the well-known distinction
between count nouns and mass nouns (also called non-count nouns). The count nouns are those that can
be combined with a numeral (and therefore also accept the plural form). They give rise to combinations like
Ten Animals, which as we discussed expresses a reality of ten identical entities all in the same state, typical
of bosonic matter in so-called Bose-Einstein condensates. On the other hand, the mass nouns are those
that have the property of not (meaningfully) combining with a numeral, without additional specifications.
This means that we cannot have many identical non-count noun-concepts all in the same state. Take the
example of the concept Courage, whose associated word has no plural form. The combination Two courage
is clearly meaningless, which means that within the human language Courage is not a boson-like conceptual
entity, as we cannot put a given number of them all in the same state. We are however allowed to write
combinations like Courage, courage, courage, as we do when we repeat a word as a rhetorical device.14 But
then there will be an order, which means that the Courage conceptual entities in the combination will be
in different states, which is the reason why the more they are in the combination, the greater will be the
space required to write them on a page in the form of words.
To push this parallel a bit further, consider also the combination Man of courage. Even if it contains
the non-countable concept Courage, it can now be meaningfully combined with a numeral, for instance
in: Ten men of courage. This means that by combining a non-countable concept with other concepts, an
emergent boson-like behavior can be obtained. This is similar to the well-known fact that fermions, when
they aggregate, can behave as bosons, like in the typical example of the α-particles (Helium nuclei). Note
that fermions can become bosons only when they are bond by some kind of interaction, which as we know
is in turn mediated by bosons. This means that, strictly speaking, fermions alone cannot form a boson:
we cannot construct bosons without bosons. In the above combination, Man is a boson-like (countable)
concept, whereas Of and Courage are not. So, we could say here that the two fermion-like concepts Of
and Courage interact through the boson-like concept Man, producing the combination Man of courage,
whose behavior is boson-like. All this is of course for the time being purely heuristic, as we cannot expect
to find within the human language conceptual realm the same level of organization of the microphysical
realm (nor by the way we should expect that the former will necessarily evolve, in a far distant future,
towards a same type of organization of the latter). In that respect, consider that the fermionic/bosonic
duality of the micro-entities is intimately related to the rotational properties of the fractionary/integer
spins they carry, according to the well-known spin-statistics theorem. However, quoting from [5]: “[· · · ]
although we can express the requirement of identity in general terms, the situation of human concepts and
their interface of memory structures has not evolved sufficiently to contain a structure where rotational
invariance may be expressed in general terms. This is also the reason that no equivalent of spin exists on
this level.” This does not mean that internal structures playing the same role in human concepts as spin
and rotational invariance could not be identified, but this is a matter of future investigations.
To conclude this section about indistinguishability, consider also the concept Animals, i.e., Animal in
the plural form, but not in a specific combination with a numeral. It clearly describes an ensemble of Animal
conceptual entities all exactly in the same state, but whose number is perfectly undetermined. If we write
Animals in an unpacked form, it can be understood as the infinite combination: One animal or two animals
or three animals or four animals, etc., which in the Hilbert space mathematical language one would write
as a coherent superposition of the states One animal, Two animals, Three animals, etc., corresponding
to the different possible numbers of Animal conceptual entities in their ground state. If you think of the
14This is called an epizeuxis (or palilogia), and is typically used for vehemence, or emphasis.
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harmonic oscillator, this would be like a state |φ〉 which is an infinite superposition of number-operator
(N = a†a) eigenstates: |φ〉 = ∑∞n=1 einφ|n〉, i.e., a state where, according to the number-phase uncertainty
relation, the indetermination on the number of entities would be maximal, whereas the indetermination on
their phases would be minimal, so much so that a description as a classical wave phenomenon would be
possible. This is not the case for fermionic (non-countable) entities, for which, as is well-known, a classical
undulatory approximation has no validity [43].
9 Measurement problem
In the previous sections, we have considered different quantum phenomena and explained how they can be
understood in the light of the conceptuality interpretation. By doing so, we have described the measuring
apparatuses as memory structures sensitive to the meaning carried by the measured quantum conceptual
entities, so that measurements would be like interrogative contexts during which a conceptual entity, usually
prepared in an abstract (superposition) state, is forced to acquire a more specific state, corresponding to
one of the possible answers that the experimental setting permit to be selected (similarly to when we
have to fill a multiple choice form having predetermined answers to select). Of course, the fact that
a measurement is like an interrogative process is a metaphor which can be used independently of the
conceptuality interpretation. Indeed, a scientist, by means of a measurement, certainly interrogates the
system subjected to it, and the outcome is the answer it receives. But this is a description only at the human
cognitive level, which is necessarily always present in a scientific experiment, as is clear that science is a
human activity. The conceptuality interpretation, however, adds a new cognitive layer: that of the meaning
driven interaction between the measured entity and the measuring apparatus. So, the following question
arises: Can human decision processes shed a light into what happens behind the scenes of a quantum
measurement process and provide an additional argument in favor of the conceptuality interpretation?
To answer the above question, we have first to identify what are the important elements characterizing
an interrogative process, when a cognitive entity is asked (or forced) to provide an answer when confronted
with a given situation (that we can represent as a conceptual entity in a given state), selecting it from a
number of predetermined possibilities. For this, we can ask what we intuitively feel when we are confronted
with interrogative/decisional contexts of this kind. What we certainly can all recognize is that there will be a
first phase during which we mentally immerse the situation in question into the context of the set of possible
answers we have been given. If the situation is initially described by a state D = |ψ〉〈ψ| (which we write here
as a projection operator), we can understand this first phase as a deterministic preparation process during
which we bring the meaning of the situation as close as possible to the meaning of the different possible
answers, which of course can also be described as final states of the conceptual entity which is the object
of the interrogation. Assuming that there are N possible answers, let us call Di = |ψi〉〈ψi|, i = 1, . . . , N ,
these possible outcome states. So, there is a first immersive process during which the initial state D will
transition to a new state De, expressing this more specific meaning-connection with the different possible
outcomes/answers Di. Since only one of them can be selected (they are mutually excluding answers),
this D → De immersive process creates a temporary state of unstable equilibrium (whence the index “e”)
between the competing tensions resulting from the different meaning-connections between De and the Di.
Therefore, a second (usually indeterministic) phase will occur, which we can also subjectively perceive. It
is the phase during which the mental tensional-equilibrium that was built is all of a sudden disturbed, in
a way that cannot usually be predicted in advance, with the disturbance causing an irreversible process
during which the conceptual state De is drawn towards one of the possible answers Di. This is really like
a (weighted) symmetry breaking process, reducing the previously competing tensions and so allowing the
cognitive entity to actualize an answer.
Note that the above two-phase cognitive process is a general description that can account also for
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situations where the answer is known in advance. In this case, the tensional equilibrium that is built will
be a trivial one, in the sense that the meaning-connection with one of the outcomes will always prevail and
produce the predetermined outcome without fail. But of course, in the general situations the interrogated
person will not have yet formed a strong opinion regarding which answer is to be selected, so that all
answers can truly play a competing role in the creation of the tensional equilibrium, and will therefore
have a non-zero probability to be selected. It is important to say that what we are describing here is really
a model of the mind’s processes and not a model of the brain’s processes, and that of course mind and brain
processes need not to be the same.15 But since the conceptuality interpretation assumes that the measuring
apparatuses behave like cognitive entities, and the measuring apparatuses are precisely what physicists use
to actualize an outcome, the following question arises: Can we also describe a quantum measurement
process as a two-phase cognitive-like process where the initial state of the measured entity is first brought
into a state of tensional equilibrium, which is subsequently broken in a way that the process exactly obeys
the predictions of the Born rule? The answer is affirmative and the description in question is contained
in the so-called general tension-reduction (GTR) model [14, 15, 18], which in the special case where the
state space is Hilbertian and the measurements are uniform reduces to the extended Bloch representation
(EBR) that we mentioned already in Sec. 7 [12, 17, 19] .
More precisely, there is a way to reformulate the standard quantum formalism by using a generalization
and extension of the historical three-dimensional Bloch sphere model, which contains an exact description
of the above two-stage process. In other words, the quantum formalism naturally generalizes and extends
into a representation which is compatible with a general description of a measurement as a cognitive-like
interrogative process. When we say that it generalizes the Bloch sphere model, it is because it applies to
quantum systems of any dimension N , in fact also of infinite dimension [21], and when we say it extends
the Bloch sphere model, it is because it allows for a description, in the same representation, of the (hidden)
measurement-interactions that are responsible for the breaking of the tensional equilibrium. It is of course
not the purpose of the present work to enter into all the mathematical details of the GTR-model or the
EBR of quantum mechanics. But let us provide some additional information about how the latter works.
By introducing a representation for the generators of SU(N), the special unitary group of degree N , it
becomes possible to associate real (N2 − 1)-dimensional unit vectors to the initial state D and the final
states Di, which we will denote r and ri, i = 1, . . . , N , respectively. These are vectors living at the surface
of a convex region of states that is inscribed in a (N2 − 1)-dimensional unit sphere B1(RN2−1), which
coincides with the latter only in the two-outcome (N = 2) case [thanks to the isomorphism between SU(2)
and SO(3)]. Now, one can show that the N vectors ri are the vertex vectors of a (N − 1)-dimensional
simplex 4N−1, inscribed both in the convex region of states and in B1(RN2−1).
The first phase of the measurement then corresponds to an immersion of the state vector r inside the
sphere, along a path that is orthogonal to 4N−1, reaching in this way an equilibrium point re ∈ 4N−1.
This is the mathematical counterpart of the stage we previously described as the cognitive activity bringing
the conceptual entity in full contact with the “potentiality region” generated by the N mutually excluding
answers. From a mathematical viewpoint, this causes the initial projection operator D, associated with
r, to gradually decohere and transform into a fully reduced density operator De =
∑N
i=1 PB(ψ → ψi)Di,
associated with the (non-unit) on-simplex vector re, where the positive numbers PB(ψ → ψi) = |〈ψi|ψ〉|2
are the Born probabilities. And this means that in the EBR also the density operators play a role as
representative of genuine states (as we mentioned already in Sec. 7, in relation to the description of
entangled sub-systems), describing the (non-unitary) evolution of the entity during the measurement itself.
At this point, we can consider the “tension lines” going from the on-simplex state re to the N outcome
states ri, partitioning4N−1 into N convex subregions Ai, formalizing the unstable tensional equilibrium we
15For example, the modeling of the activity of Broca’s area is very different from the modeling of how human language is
used, although of course there will be correlates.
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Figure 9: The unfolding of a measurement as a tension-reduction process, here with three possible (non-degenerate) outcomes:
r1, r2 and r3. The abstract point particle representative of the initial state is positioned in r, at the surface of the eight-
dimensional sphere B1(R8) (which of course cannot be drawn). It then orthogonally “falls” onto the triangular elastic substance
42 (an equilateral triangle) generated by the three outcomes, reaching the point re and so defining three convex sub-regions:
A1, A2 and A3. The substance of 42 then starts disintegrating at some unpredictable point, here inside A1, so that A1 fully
disintegrates and detaches from its two anchor points, thus drawing the point particle to its final location, here r1.
previously described. We can imagine these N regions to be filled with an abstract elastic and disintegrable
substance, so that when one of the regions – say region Ai – starts disintegrating in a given internal point
(this is the disturbance we previously described, due to the unavoidable fluctuations that are present in a
measurement context), the disintegrative process will propagate within it, so that its N − 1 anchor points
will detach, with the consequence that the equilibrium state re (we can imagine it as an abstract point
particle attached to the elastic substance) will be brought towards the remaning vertex vector, here ri,
thus producing the measurement outcome (see Figure 9, for the N = 3 case). It then follows from the
geometric properties of the structures involved that if we calculate the probability that the disintegration
point happens in sub-region Ai, which is simply given by the ratio
µ(Ai)
µ(4N−1) between the (N−1)-dimensional
volume (or Lebesgue measure) of sub-region Ai and that of the full simplex4N−1, that such ratio is exactly
given by the probabilities PB(ψ → ψi) = |〈ψi|ψ〉|2, i.e., by the quantum mechanical Born rule [12, 14].
Let us mention that the process we just described, and its mathematical modeling, also generalizes to the
situation of degenerate measurements (see the above references), when the tension-reduction process does
not result in a full resolution of the conflict between all the competing answers, so that the state is brought
into a state of sub-equilibrium, between a reduced set of possibilities, described by a lower-dimensional
sub-simplex of 4N−1. To conclude this section about quantum measurements, let us also consider what
could be a possible objection regarding our parallel between measurements in physics laboratories and
cognitive processes where a mind-like entity selects one among a set of possible answers, according to the
information stored in its memory. As we know, when we answer a question, the way we do so can vary
every time, depending on the mental state we are at that moment. Also, the way of choosing an answer of
a person will generally differ from the way of choosing of another person. On the other hand, a measuring
apparatus always chooses in the same way, which is the way described by the Born rule. In other words,
each person should be associated with quantum-like probabilities which will generally differ from those
predicted by the Born rule. This is of course correct, and as we mentioned already, we should not think of
human culture, and the cognitive processes associated with it, as a reality domain that would have reached
the level of symmetry and of organization of the micro-physical domain.
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But to be truthful, we don’t really know if the measuring apparatuses always choose according to the
Born rule. All we know is that the Born rule emerges from the statistics constructed from numerous
outcomes. We thus cannot exclude that at each run j of a measurement the apparatus would select an
outcome according to probabilities P (j)(ψ → ψi) which would generally differ from the Born probabilities
PB(ψ → ψi). This would mean that an apparatus not only actualizes an outcome from a set of potential
ones, but also, at a deeper level, actualizes a way of choosing an outcome from a (typically infinite) set of
potential ways of choosing. Of course, for this to be consistent with the results we usually observe in the
labs, the average 〈P (ψ → ψi)〉 = 1N
∑n
j=1 P
(j)(ψ → ψi) should tend to the Born probability PB(ψ → ψi),
as n → ∞, for all i = 1, . . . , N . This kind of average, called a universal average, can be studied in
the GTR-model by considering abstract non-uniform substances disintegrating in all possible ways, thus
giving rise to all possible sets of probabilities for the different outcomes. These different non-uniform
substances would describe the different “mental states” of the apparatus at each run of the measurement,
and the remarkable result is that one can show that a universal measurement (when the state space is
Hilbertian), exactly corresponds to a uniform measurement described by the quantum mechanical Born
rule [12, 15, 19].16
10 Relativity
To continue our exploration of the fertility of the conceptuality interpretation in providing new ways of
explaining fundamental physical phenomena, we will now address relativity theory. Indeed, not only the
quantum phenomena, but also the relativistic ones, do challenge our classical prejudices and, as we are
now going to explain, also for them the conceptuality interpretation can help us shed some light on their
possible origin. In doing so, we will limit ourselves to consider the phenomenon of time dilation. Also, we
will limit our discussion to non-quantum relativistic entities (classical bodies) and will just provide at the
end some clues about how to extend the reasoning to the quantum domain as well. But to begin with, let
us observe that although the term “relativity” has been historically attached to Einstein, it refers in fact
to a principle (the relativity principle) that is much more ancient, as it was already described by Galileo
Galilei in his famous example of the ship advancing at uniform speed, with people locked in the cabin
beneath the deck not able to determine whether the ship was moving or just standing still [39]. In fact,
one also finds descriptions of this principle as early as the first century B.C., i.e., 1700 years before Galileo,
in China, in The Apocryphal Treatise on the Shang Shu Section of the Historical Classic: Investigation of
the Mysterious Brightnesses (Shang Shu Wei Kao Ling Yao), where one can read: “Although people dont
know it, the earth is constantly moving, just as someone sitting in a large boat with the cabin window
closed is unaware that the boat is moving.”
A possible synthetic statement of the relativistic principle is as follows: “Equivalent viewpoints exist on
the physical world.” When the principle is formalized by using the notion of reference frame, it then becomes
[45]: “Equivalent frames of reference (space-time coordinate systems) exist for the physical laws, i.e., such
that the physical laws have exactly the same form in all of them.” This does not mean, however, that the
different physical quantities will have the same values in the different equivalent reference frames: it means
that they will obey exactly the same relations, so that phenomena will be perceived in the same way when
experienced from these different but equivalent reference frames.17 The simplest examples of equivalent
frames of reference are those that are translated or rotated with respect to each other, but Galileo, and
16See also [13], for a discussion of the notion of universal average in relation to Bertrand’s paradox.
17Of course, not all reference frames are equivalent. For example, when we are on a carousel rotating at a given speed,
we will experience phenomena that would be absent if the carousel would be at rest, like the centrifugal pseudo forces. The
interesting content of the principle of relativity is therefore that among the countless possible reference frames, some non-trivial
ones exist that are perfectly equivalent.
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before him the ancient Chinese sages, identified a more interesting non-trivial class of equivalent reference
frames: those moving with respect to each other at constant speed, called inertial frames. The remarkable
consequence of inertial frames that are equivalent frames is that an object moving at constant speed, from
the viewpoint of the laws of physics, must be described in exactly the same way as an object at rest, i.e., as
an entity on which the resultant force acting on it is zero. The first law of Newton, or principle of inertia
then immediately follows: an object in motion at constant speed, like an object at rest, will forever remain
in such state of motion, if not acted upon by some additional force.
A much more remarkable consequence follows from the observation that there are wave phenomena (like
the electromagnetic ones) that appear to propagate through the very “substance of space,” once called the
ether. Indeed, if this would be the case, i.e., if space would be substantial and waves could propagate
through its medium, then some physical effects (like interference effects) should manifest differently in
different inertial frames, thus contradicting the very relativistic principle. But if the principle is true, as
it appears to be, these differences should not be observed, and in fact have not so far been observed, for
instance in the historical Michelson-Morley experiment and in those that followed, which showed instead
that the speed of propagation in space of the electromagnetic fields is always the same, for all inertial
frames and in all directions. This means that space, understood as an encompassing substantial theater
for reality, becomes a problematic notion and that what we call space is essentially a relational construct,
so that each physical entity, with its unique perspective, would actually inhabit ‘a different space’. And
this means that, as it will become clearer in the following, we do not see objects moving in space because
they would actually move in an objective spatial theater, but because we confer them a movement in
order to keep them inside our personal spatial representation. Now, as is well-known, when the relativistic
principle is applied in conjunction with some very general and natural hypothesis about space and time,
the Lorentz transformations are obtained as the only possible transformations connecting the different
equivalent inertial frames [44]. Remarkably, these transformations do not affect only the spatial coordinates,
but also the temporal ones, and the consequence is that objects, when they move with respect to a given
reference frame, they are shorter in comparison to when they are at rest (length contraction), and also,
objects called clocks, when they move also run more slowly in comparison to clocks that are at rest (time
dilation). This means that what relativity is telling us is that the spatial constructs associated with the
different physical entities cannot be just spatial, but have to be genuinely spatiotemporal.
To highlight this fact, consider the following thought experiment (see [4] for a more extensive discussion).
Imagine that you are at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), in Belgium (usually referred to as the Free
University of Brussels, in English-speaking contexts), and that it is September 29, 2017, say 3 pm.18 We
can call this your personal present moment t0. When you are at VUB, at time t0, since you are having a
direct experience with the university, you can affirm with certainty that VUB is real for you, i.e., that VUB
is an existing element of your present personal material reality. But what about the reality of, say, the
Universita´ della Svizzera italiana (USI), in Switzerland (usually referred to as the University of Lugano,
in English-speaking contexts)? Since at time t0 you are at the VUB, and you are not having an experience
with the USI, can you nevertheless affirm that the USI is also an element of your present personal reality,
at time t0? The answer is positive, and the reason for this is that, following EPR’s reality criterion,
19 we
18On September 29–30, 2017, the Centre Leo Apostel for Interdisciplinary Studies (CLEA), Belgium, has organized the
international symposium “Worlds of Entanglement,” during which one of the authors presented the guidelines of the concep-
tuality interpretation to an heterogeneous audience, formed not only by physicists, but also mathematicians, social scientists,
biologists, artists, philosophers, economists, and others. The present article, is an extended version of the content of that
presentation.
19In a famous article written in 1935, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) recognized that our construction of reality is
based on our predictions about it. The original wording of their criterion is [38]: “If, without in any way disturbing a system,
we can predict with certainty [...] the value of a physical quantity, then there exist an element of physical reality corresponding
to this physical quantity.” For a discussion of the criterion, see [52] and the references cited therein.
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know that reality is a construction about the possible: if, in your past, you would have decided to travel
to Lugano, Switzerland, then with certainty you would have had a direct experience with the USI at the
present time t0, and considering the certainty of such a prediction, you can say that also the USI is an
element of your personal reality, at time t0. Consider now the VUB at subsequent time t1 > t0, where
t1 is September 30, 2017, 3 pm, i.e., one day in your future with respect to your present time t0. Is the
VUB at time t1 also an element of your reality? If we rely only on our parochial conception of space and
time, we would respond negatively, but this would be a wrong answer considering what we know about
the relativistic effects, and more specifically the effect of time dilation: the slowdown of the ticking rate of
moving clocks, when compared to those that remain at rest.
Indeed, if in your past, say on September 28, 2017, 3 pm, you would have used a space ship to travel
at speed v =
√
3
4 c (where c is the speed of light) to any destination, then back again along the same
route, because of the relativistic time dilation effect you could have been back at VUB exactly when your
smartphone would indicate September 29, 2017, 3 pm, whereas the smartphones of all other people at
VUB would indicate September 30, 2017, 3 pm. So, if you take seriously EPR’s reality criterion, you must
conclude that the VUB, one day in its future, is also an element of your present personal reality. Now,
since the present discussion is aimed at an interdisciplinary audience, we think it can be useful to also
briefly explain how time dilation is calculated in relativity theory. So, there are two versions here of the
same individual, one remaining at rest at VUB,20 who we will call entity A, and the other performing the
round-trip journey, who we will call entity B (see Figure 10). If we denote tB the time-period of the clock
carried by B during her/his trip, as measured by A, using an identical clock remaining at VUB, the time
period of which is τA,
21 s/he will observe a time dilation effect, i.e., that tB is greater than τA. More
specifically, if v is the speed of B (when moving away or approaching A), then we have tB = γ τA, where
γ = 1/
√
1− v2
c2
is the so-called Lorentz gamma factor, which is equal to 2 for the above value of the speed
v. Hence, we have that tB = 2τA, i.e., that the clock traveling with B appears to A to run twice as slow
than the clock that remained at VUB.
Let us now assume that A measures nA cycles of her/his clock for the entire duration of the trip of
B.22 Since tB = γ τA, the number of cycles nB of the clock of B will be obtained by solving the equation:
nAτA = nBtB = nBγ τA, which gives nB =
nA
γ , and for our value of the speed v we have: nB =
nA
2 .
In other words, the traveling entity B uses half the time-cycles of the non-traveling entity A. Now, to
determine the time t < t0 (where t0 corresponds to September 29, 2017, 3 pm) at which B would have
needed to start her/his space travel at speed v =
√
3
4 c, in order to be back at the same place, at VUB, at
time t1 (corresponding to September 30, 2017, 3 pm), with her/his clock indicating September 29, 2017,
3 pm, we can reason as follows. By definition, we have nA =
t1−t
τA
, and let us also denote n′A the number
of cycles corresponding to a one day (24 hours) period: n′A =
t1−t0
τA
. We want that nB = nA − n′A, i.e., we
want the clock of B to use 24 hours less than the clock of A. Since nB =
nA
γ , we obtain nA =
γ
γ−1 n
′
A, so
that for γ = 2 we have nA = 2n
′
A. In other words, B has to start her/his trip two days before September
30, 2017, 3 pm, that is, on September 28, 2017, 3 pm (see Figure 10).
Coming back to our discussion, being our personal present reality defined in a counterfactual way, via
the EPR criterion, we have to conclude, as a consequence of the relativistic generalized parallax effects,
that our personal present also contains a part of our personal future. However, this not in the sense that
20VUB being on the surface of planet Earth, strictly speaking it cannot be associated with an inertial frame, but for simplicity
we will neglect the planet’s non-uniform motion in our reasoning.
21Note that we are using a different notation for the two time periods τA and tB . This because the former is a so-called
proper time, i.e., a time measured by a clock which remains at rest with respect to A, whereas the latter is a coordinate time,
i.e., a time measured by a clock which is not at rest with respect to B.
22For simplicity of the discussion, we will neglect that there are also accelerations experienced by B, at her/his departure,
turnaround and arrival.
33
Figure 10: The two worldlines of the entities A and B, in the spacetime construction associated with the former. Entity A
is spatially at rest, thus only moves along her time axis, whereas entity B goes on a round-trip journey, allowing her to meet
again with entity A, in her – one day after – future.
all of our future would be given, as if the universe would be an unchanging block. Indeed, if it is true
that in a given reference frame we can always attach time and space coordinates to the different events,
this doesnt mean that the processes of change that have created them are also happening in space and
time. Indeed, these processes typically originate from a non-spatiotemporal realm, which remains hidden
from our limited spatiotemporal perspective. So, if Galilean relativity has told us that physical entities
are not inhabiting a substantive objective space, as each entity constructs a personal three-dimensional
relational space, Einsteinian relativity has pushed such view a step further, telling us that entities are not
only not inhabiting a substantive space, but also that they do not construct their time axis in the same
way, i.e., that each entity constructs a personal four-dimensional spacetime. We thus see that, similarly to
quantum mechanics, relativity also indicates the existence of an underlying non-spatial and non-temporal
realm. And as we are now going to explain, the hypothesis that physical entities would have primarily a
conceptual nature is not only able to offer an explanation for the strangeness of the quantum effects, but
also for the relativistic ones, which are erroneously considered to be less strange than the former (if we try
to understand them by maintaining a purely spatiotemporal perspective).
11 Time dilation
Let us consider again the previous example, assuming this time that A and B are not two different versions
of the same person, who made a different choice in the past, but two different physical entities, so that
we are now in the specific situation of Langevin’s twin-paradox. Note that the reason why it was referred
to as a paradox is the fact that one could argue that by considering the viewpoint of the reference frame
associated with the space ship, it is the entity remaining on Earth that appears to have performed the return
trip. This apparent symmetry between the two descriptions is however broken as soon as one observes that
the two reference frames are non-equivalent, as is clear that the frame associated with entity B, using the
space ship, is a non-inertial one. In other words, the symmetry is broken by observing that B experiences
accelerations that are not experienced by A (neglecting those associated with the rotation of the planet).
One should not conclude, however, that the observed time-dilation effect (or length contraction effect, from
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the viewpoint of the traveling entity) would be caused by these accelerations: it is in fact the geometric
structure of the worldlines associated with the two entities that is responsible for the time dilation, which is
truly defined by the Lorentz-invariant length corresponding to the so-called proper time interval associated
with them [11].
The two entities A and B are here considered to be classical macroscopic bodies, i.e., ordinary objects.
However, as we discussed in Sec. 6, in the conceptuality interpretation objects are idealizations of story-like
conceptual entities that can be in different meaning-states. So, we want now to consider the two entities
A and B not as objects moving in space but, primarily (and more fundamentally), as conceptual entities
that can have meaning driven interactions. In relativity, one usually associate observers with entities in
different states of motion, where the notion of observer is typically understood as a shortcut for a reference
frame plus an entity that, if it would be present in some specific location, would be able to perceive (detect,
measure) phenomena relative to the viewpoint of that reference frame and specific location.23 We will also
associate observers with the two entities A and B, but we will consider them as mind-like entitities sensitive
to the meaning carried by A and B. Let us simply call them cognitive observers, and denote them CA and
CB. These two observers are however not associated with spatiotemporal frames of reference. The only
aspect distinguishing CA from CB is that the former is focused on the evolution of A, whereas the latter
is focused on the evolution of B.
To fix ideas, we can simply consider that the process of change of state of entity A corresponds to
the cognitive activity of entity CA, reflecting on a given problem, so that the initial state of A would
correspond to the Hypothesis initiating such reflection, and the final state of A to the Conclusion reached
by CA, after having followed a certain number of intermediary conceptual steps. And same for the cognitive
observer CB, following the evolution of the conceptual entity B.
24 Here we will assume that CA and CB
are just witnessing the unfolding of the meanings carried by A and B, as they evolve, i.e., that they are not
themselves producing the observed changes of their states. Also, to place ourselves in the “twin-paradox”
situation, we consider that CA and CB are both reflecting on the same problem, starting with the same
Hypothesis and subsequently jointly reaching the same Conclusion. In other words, in the conceptual
abstract realm that they both inhabit, they have a first meeting at the “place” of their commonly shared
Hypothesis, then a second encounter when they reach the same Conclusion. The difference between CA
and CB, however, is that the cognitive path they follow to reach that same Conclusion, starting from the
same Hypothesis, is not the same, in the sense that CA, focused on the evolution of A, is assumed to use nA
conceptual steps to do so, whereas CB, focused on the evolution of B, is assumed to use a lesser number
of steps nB < nA. Let us denote Ai, i = 0, 1, . . . , nA, the different states through which A passes to go
from the Hypothesis = A0, to the Conclusion = AnA , and let us denote Bi, i = 0, 1, . . . , nB, the states B
transition through to also go from the Hypothesis = B0, to the Conclusion = BnB .
Imagine then that the cognitive observer CA, to keep track in an orderly manner of the conceptual
path followed by entity A, decides to introduce an axis to parameterize each one of A’s conceptual steps.
For this, it will ascribe a unit length LA to such axis, corresponding to a single conceptual step, and it
will also assume that the speed at which each step is accomplished is the same for all steps and is equal
to a given constant c, so that the duration of a single step is: τA =
LA
c . When going from the Hypothesis
to the Conclusion, the reasoning of CA will thus correspond to a movement of entity A, along such order
parameter axis, going from an initial point D0 to a final point DnA = D0 + nALA = c (t0 + nAτA), where
we have defined the times ti =
1
c (D0+ iLA), i = 0, . . . , nA, where t0 =
D0
c is the initial time and tnA =
DnA
c
the final time. Consider now the evolution of entity B, which we assumed can reach the same Conclusion
23To quote a passage from [37] (emphasis is our): “If the observer perceives the two flashes of lightning at the same time,
then they are simultaneous.”
24This means that we are here considering A and B to correspond to the conceptual entities Reasoning of CA and Reasoning
of CB , respectively.
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Figure 11: The coordination of the conceptual paths followed by the two entities A and B, in the spacetime constructed by the
cognitive observer CA (here in the situation nA = 8 and nB = 4). When measured along the time axis of A (multiplied by the
constant speed c) the length LB = ctB of the conceptual steps of B appear to be longer than the length LA = c τA of those of
A. However, when measured along the direction of its own movement in the A-spacetime, using the Minkowski instead of the
Euclidean metric, one finds that the conceptual steps of the two entities are exactly of the same length, in accordance with
the fact that they both move at the same (absolute) constant speed c in the underlying conceptual realm.
following a shorter conceptual path, only made of nB < nA steps, and for simplicity we will consider here
that nB =
nA
2 . The cognitive observer CA can also decide to focus on the evolution of B, i.e., might also
be willing to keep track of the cognitive path followed by entity B, in addition to that of A. Now, if A and
B are entities of the same nature, it can be assumed that when they produce a cognitive step, they do so
at the same speed c. But then, since the path followed by B in the abstract conceptual realm is such that
it can reach the same Conclusion in half the steps used by A, the cognitive observer CA cannot represent
such path on the same axis used to parametrize the path of A, as units on the latter were precisely chosen
in a way that one needs twice the number of steps to reach the Conclusion.
To consistently parametrize also the evolution of B, CA is thus forced to introduce an additional axis,
and use the additional dimension generated by such axis to describe B as moving on a round-trip path,
now contained in a higher dimensional space generated by both the first parametric axis – let us call it the
time axis of A – and this second parametric axis – let us call it the space axis of A. So, the evolution of
entity B is described as a movement on a path leading away from such time axis and then coming back
to it, to reach the Conclusion meeting point, and this by doing exactly nA2 cognitive steps (see Figure 11).
However, if we consider the construction of this parametric space from a purely Euclidean perspective,
we immediately see that things do not work. Indeed, if we calculate the length of the B-path using the
Pythagorean theorem, we will necessarily find a path that is longer than that walked by A.
This would not be correct, as is clear that B follows a shorter conceptual path, only using half of the
conceptual steps used by A. Therefore, when measuring the length of B’s conceptual path, it should be
shorter and not longer than that of A. For CA to fix this problem, the only way to go is to consider a pseudo-
Euclidean space, instead of an Euclidean one, and more precisely that specific pseudo-Euclidean space
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known as the Minkowski space (or spacetime), where distances are not calculated using the Pythagorean
theorem, but a pseudo-Pythagorean theorem attaching a negative sign to the squares of the components
associated with the space axis, and a positive sign to the square of the components associated with the time
axis. In this way, the length of the hypotenuse of a right triangle, whose catheti are associated with the
time and space axes, respectively, will generally be less than the length of the time-cathetus. It becomes
then possible for the length LB of a single conceptual step of B (see Figure 11) to be exactly equal to the
length LA of a single conceptual step of A, i.e., to have the equality LA = LB, which is what CA wants to
have, as the two entities A and B are assumed to change state at the same absolute speed c (the speed of
light in vacuum) in their common conceptual realm, so that the duration/length of their conceptual steps
must be an invariant, i.e., the same for all entities.
More precisely, if L is the component of the length LB along the space axis of A, then according to the
pseudo-Euclidean (Minkowski) metric we have: L2B = (ctB)
2−L2, so that the requirement that LA = LB,
or equivalently L2A = (c τA)
2 = L2B, considering that τA =
1
γtB and c τA =
c
γ tB =
√
c2 − v2 tB, gives:
(c2−v2)t2B = (ctB)2−L2, that is, L = vtB. In other words, by adopting a pseudo-Euclidean (Minkowski)
metric, the cognitive observer CA is able to construct a spacetime theater in which it can keep track, in
a consistent way, not only of the cognitive process associated with A, but also of that associated with
B,25 and to do so all it has to do is to attach an appropriate spatial velocity v to characterize its state
changes. In other words, the reason for the time-dilation generalized parallax effects becomes clear when the
existence of an underlying conceptual realm is taken into consideration: since CA has to also parametrize
the cognitive path of B, and cannot do it using the same time-axis, it has to consider a movement within
a higher dimensional space, characterized by an angle α = tan−1 vc with respect to the direction of the
movement of A. This will inevitably introduce temporal effects of perspective: CA will observe B as if it
was producing conceptual steps (or cycles) having an increased duration tB = γτA. This means that CA,
focusing its attention on A, when it compares its cognitive activity with that of an observer CB, focusing its
attention on B, will have the impression that CB reasons more slowly than itself, but since it also reasons
more efficaciously, as it uses a lesser number of conceptual steps, they are nevertheless able to meet at the
common Conclusion state. This is just how things appear to be at the level of the spacetime parametrical
construction operated by CA. At the more objective level of the non-spatiotemporal conceptual realm, A
and B move at exactly the same speed c, which is the intrinsic speed at which they both perform their
conceptual steps.
Our description of time-dilation effects would of course require more explanations, and we refer the
reader to [11], where more details can be found. Our main point here was to highlight that relativity
theory, similarly to quantum mechanics, indicates the existence of a non-spatiotemporal conceptual realm.
As we mentioned already, our discussion indicates that its non-temporality is however not to be understood
in the sense of an absence of processes of change. On the contrary, every conceptual (physical) entities would
incessantly change state, i.e., produce new conceptual steps, by all “surfing” over the conceptual realm at
the light speed c. Therefore, at a more fundamental level, movement would be incessant, and in a sense
absolute. This is possible because it is not a movement in space and time, as space and time would only
emerge when a cognitive observer decides to coordinate the evolution of a given conceptual entity with the
evolution of other conceptual entities, introducing for this a specific Cartesian coordinate system. In such
system, the time axis orders the conceptual changes of the entity the cognitive observer decides to primarily
bring its focus to, whereas the spatial axes order the evolution of the other conceptual entities, relative
to such proper time-axis, by representing them as movements in space. Such spatiotemporal construction,
to be consistent, requires the metric to be Minkowskian, which of course remains counterintuitive to us
humans, as we evolved on this planet by mostly interacting with entities moving extremely slowly in space
25A single spatial axis is sufficient when considering only two entities. However, additional space axes are needed if further
entities are considered; see [11].
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with respect to one another, i.e., that are almost at rest with respect to one another, so that the relativistic
parallax effects, being negligible, were not integrated in our mental representation of the world.
Of course, this spatiotemporal representation only works for conceptual entities having reached the
status of objects, the so-called classical macroscopic bodies. When micro-physical entities are considered,
the time-space duality must be replaced by a more general duality between time and the set of outcome-
states associated with the different possible measurements. This is for instance the situation where the
cognitive observer CA would not merely witness the surfing of entity A over the more fundamental con-
ceptual realm, but in fact would also affect its surfing through its observation, thus also introducing in
its evolution the additional ingredient of indeterminism. Note that the possibility for CA to also act as a
quantum measurement context for entity A is not incompatible with the special situation of a deterministic
evolution. Indeed, any deterministic change of state can in principle be conceived as being the result of
a measurement having just a single possible outcome.26 This means that deterministic evolutions can in
principle be described as recursive applications of multiple one-outcome measurement processes. Some of
these processes will be governed by classical contexts, and the corresponding deterministic evolution can
be described as an ‘evolution in space’, others will be governed by genuine quantum contexts, and the
corresponding deterministic evolution cannot be described as happening in space, but in a more abstract
(conceptual) non-spatial (and non-temporal) realm.
We already mentioned in Secs. 7 and 9 the extended Bloch representation (EBR) of quantum mechanics
[12, 17, 19], which can be used to construct a quantum theater in which all the measurement processes
associated with a quantum entity, and its states, can be jointly represented. For measurement contexts
admitting sets of up to N possible outcome-states, the number of required dimensions for the associated
Blochean quantum theater is equal to N2 − 1, which is the number of generators of the SU(N) group of
transformations. Roughly speaking, these transformations can be interpreted as “generalized rotations,”
and this means that to enter such Blochean theater one has in a sense to “rotate away” the intrinsic
complexity of a quantum entity, by means of these generators. A human conceptual analogy here would be
that of considering that to enter a given space of discourse, like that of a political agenda, certain concepts
first need to receive a “twist.” Our spatiotemporal theater, considered as a specific space of discourse,
would require in the same way specific “twists” to be applied, for the different quantum conceptual entities
to enter and be representable in it.
We conclude our discussion about relativistic effects with a brief remark about gravitation. As is
well known, we are still lacking a satisfactory quantum gravity theory, and this because the fundamental
forces in the Standard Model of particle physics are modeled as (quantized) fields in a fixed spatiotemporal
background, whereas the gravitational forces precisely affect that background, making it a dynamical
one. Different from the Standard Model and similar approaches, attaching a fundamental role to the
spatiotemporal canvas, the conceptuality interpretation posits that reality is not contained in spacetime,
the latter being just a relational construction emerging each time a very specific interface is considered:
that between the macroscopic pieces of matter and the force fields acting on them, i.e., between the
fermionic constructions and their bosonic way of exchanging meaning. It is in this interface that the
illusion was formed of a spatiotemporal theater in which our physical reality would be fully contained; an
illusion which was then consolidated through the very scientific experimental method, somehow forcing us
to only approach our physical reality through such interface, as is clear that physicists, in their laboratories,
always collect data from experiments involving apparatuses formed by macro-pieces of matter. If space
and time (we should better say spaces and times) are by-products of this very specific interface, we can
more easily understand the reason of the difficulties that were encountered in the attempts to construct
a consistent quantum gravity theory. The conceptuality interpretation, by pointing to the existence of a
more fundamental and abstract realm, in which the physical conceptual entities evolve, the fundamental
26Hence, two-outcome measurement processes would not constitute the simplest imaginable measurement situation.
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forces, gravity included, are then allowed to be understood as expressions of the different ways conceptual
entities can exchange meaning, and because of that be brought together, or apart.
12 Conclusion
It is time to move towards the conclusion of our tour d’horizon of the conceptuality interpretation and
its explicative power. In this last section, we will just evocate some possible directions for subsequent
investigations, and in this regard we also refer the interested readers to [5, 7, 8, 9, 10].
Concerning the so far failed tentative to unify gravitational and quantum elements of reality within
a unique consistent theoretical construction, which we mentioned in the previous section, let us observe
that the conceptuality interpretation brings another interesting line of reflection: it is also a possibility
that a single ‘quantum plus gravitational’ description might not be feasible, in the sense that ‘quantum’
and ‘gravity’ could very well be incompatible descriptions, in the same way that position and momentum
measurements are incompatible experimental contexts. Indeed, a conceptual reality is also a contextual
reality, i.e., a reality where certain meanings would be actualized and actualizable only in certain contexts,
and not in others. In that respect, classical physics can also be understood as a description emerging
from a very specific context, produced by us humans mostly manifesting and interacting with physical
entities through our macroscopic dense bodies. Standard quantum mechanics, and more precisely its
formalization through the Hilbertian formalism, can be considered as another context associated with
different operationally posed questions, whose answers cannot be all organized in the ‘space of relations’
that resulted from the previous classical construction, forming a sort of closed representational environment
(somehow in the spirit of Heisenbergs notion of closed theories [31]). But the quantum representation,
which also has its structural shortcomings, might as well form another closed environment, considering for
instance its inability to describe entities that can remain separated in experimental terms [1, 10, 23]. In
other words, it is also possible that a single encompassing representation could not be obtained, precisely
because it would correspond to the unrealistic desiderata of simultaneously actualizing properties/meanings
that are in ultimate analysis associated with incompatible contexts.27
In addition to that, the conceptuality interpretation, with its hypothesis that physical entities are
fundamentally conceptual, also fosters a pancognitivist view (as was mentioned in the Introduction), where
every element of reality would in fact participate in cognition, with human cognition being just a special
case of it, appearing at a very particular organizational level. This has clearly deep consequences on our
view about evolution in general, as the advent of the biological species on our planet, including the human
one, would only be part of a much wider and fundamental process of change resulting from the interaction
of conceptual entities with the countless cognitive structures that are sensitive to their meaning, and this
since the dawn of the formation of our universe and at different levels of the same. If this is correct, the
default picture we should adopt in the description of our evolving physical reality is that of a huge and
multilayered cultural evolution [20]. So, in the same way we humans use concepts and their combinations
to communicate and evolve our cultures, the same might have occurred, and would still be occurring, in
the micro-realm, and this automatically provides a compelling explanation for so-called dark matter, which
can then be understood as that part of matter which, as an interface, has not co-evolved together with the
bosonic “messenger” entities. Think of the abundance in our human environment of those structures that
cannot exchange human meaning, i.e., the ordinary pieces of matter as opposed to the cultural artifacts,
the former being much more abundant than the latter. The same could be for dark matter, as opposed
to ordinary matter, which not only does not interact with the bosonic micro-carriers of meaning, but also
appears to be indeed much more abundant. On the other hand, gravity, by working at a very different
27This is a view that subtends a notion of realism that was recently introduced and called multiplex realism [22, 23].
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scale than all the other forces, would possibly describe a more ancient way of exchanging meaning and
creating concentrations of it; a way which has remained in common with both ordinary and dark matter.
This special role played by gravitation can also be seen in the diversity of the mass values of the different
micro-physical entities, which are not just multiples of some fundamental unit, as it is the case for instance
for the electric charge. This seems to suggest that mass is not so much connected to the notion of identity
of a given conceptual entity, but instead to the different possible ways a given identity is able to manifest.
Think of the puzzling existence of the three different generations of elementary micro-entities. Entities that
are members of these different generations interact exactly in the same way, but differ in their masses. To
give an example, there are three different electronic entities: the ordinary electron of the first generation,
having a mass of 0.511 MeV/c2, the muonic electron of the second generation, having a larger mass of
106 MeV/c2, and finally the tauonic electron of the third generation, with an even larger mass of 1777
MeV/c2 (almost twice the mass of a proton). The conceptuality interpretation offers the following possible
element of explanation for these different generations of micro-entities: they would simply correspond to
different energetic realizations of a same conceptual entity, in the same way as in our human culture a
concept can manifest as, say, a spoken sound-energetic form, an electromagnetic and/or electronic form,
in a carved into stone form, etc., and all these different forms, although they have different mass-energies,
they nevertheless always convey the same meaning, i.e., they interact in a meaning-driven environment in
exactly (or almost exactly) the same way.
Let us for a moment also mention the issue of the observed intrinsic expansion of the universe, according
to current Big Bang theories. The recurring question is: “In what the universe is expanding into?” And the
recurring answer is: “This is a nonsensical question, as the universe contains everything and there is nothing
into which it could be expanding, so, it is just expanding!” Of course, this kind of answer is perceived
as highly unsatisfactory to the layman, and rightly so, as we think it should be unsatisfactory to the
professional physicist as well. As we discussed at length in this article [4]: “Reality is not contained within
space. Space is a momentaneous crystallization of a theatre for reality where the motions and interactions
of the macroscopic material and energetic entities take place. But other entities – like quantum entities
for example – ‘take place’ outside space, or – and this would be another way of saying the same thing –
within a space that is not the three-dimensional Euclidean space.” The conceptuality interpretation allows
one to push even further this statement, by observing that reality’s non-spatiality results from it being
of a fundamental conceptual nature, implying the existence of a multilayered structure resulting from the
interplay between states having different degrees of abstractness and concreteness.
In other words, the expansion of our universe would simply be the result of a cosmic-cultural evolution
constantly creating new stories (through a mechanism of conceptual combination), which emerge from
a substrate of more abstract entities (i.e., conceptual entities in more abstract states) that can combine
together to form more complex states. To draw a parallel with the Web, think of the constant creation
of new webpages, arising from the activity of all cognitive entities participating in the associated human
meaning-driven interactions. In that respect, it is interesting to observe that the expansion of the Web,
since the first web-site was published back in 1991, has been an accelerated one, so one can also think of
the observed increasing rate of expansion of our universe to be the result, mutatis mutandis, of a cultural
accelerated growth mechanism. Let us also mention that a conceptual reality also points to the possibility
of multiverses (not in the sense of the many-worlds interpretations), as is clear that stories sharing common
meanings can form aggregates, and that some of them might have form a very long time ago, around an
initial “seed concept.” Just to offer another analogy, think of so-called “shared cinematic universes” of our
recent years movie culture: each shared cinematic universe contains a growing number of films (stories)
that are all meaning connected, focusing on different characters or group of characters, but all part of a
same coherent and non-contradictory continuity. On the other hand, stories about characters in a given
cinematic universe will never appear in another one, and if “crossovers” nevertheless happen (think of DC
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Comics’ Superman possibly meeting Marvel Studios’ Spider-Man), the associated stories will be usually
considered to be non-canon, i.e., more abstract states of the characters involved, for instance described as
alternate realities, “what if” scenarios, jokes and gags, dreams, etc.
When it comes to our spatiotemporal universe and its vastness, the question of the possible presence of
intelligent extraterrestrial life also arises in a natural way, also because the majority of scientists is convinced
that intelligent extraterrestrials populate space, resulting in various scientific programs that over time have
been funded for the search for intelligent life. As Carl Sagan used to say, in a famous science-fiction novel
[51]: “The universe is a pretty big place. If it’s just us, seems like an awful waste of space.” Space, however,
would only be the tip of the iceberg of a realty whose spatiotemporal manifestation would only correspond
to a thin layer of it. We can of course explore “in width” such layer, which certainly is a vast territory
if considered from our human limited perspective, but following the view that we have expressed in the
present article, there is another territory, incredibly wider, which is about exploring reality “in depth,”
in the direction of its more abstract states. This is what physicists have begun to do when designing
refined experiments about the many different quantum and relativistic effects. These experiments, and the
associated efforts to describe their outcomes by means of a suitable formal language,28 can be seen to be
our first primitive steps in learning a non-human and more universal proto-language, so perhaps it will be
by exploring reality along this “in depth” direction that contacts with extra-terrestrial (extra-dimensional)
intelligence will firstly occur, if they have not already occurred [20].
Let us also mention John Wheeler’s famous “it from bit” epitome, which he used to indicate that [57]:
“all things physical are information-theoretic in origin,” in a participatory universe. The conceptuality
interpretation completes Wheeler’s account in two different ways. First of all, by extending the notion of
participant, which is not limited to humans creating meaning by operating measurement devices, as the
latter (and more generally, all pieces of matter) would themselves be meaning-sensitive entities able to
exchange information, independently of the presence of the human consciousnesses. Secondly, by observing
that “bit,” understood as a unit of measure in meaning exchanges, is not what combines to construct
the physical entities of our spatiotemporal environment, or to more generally produce the different physi-
cal phenomena.29 What combines is not the bits of information, but the conceptual entities carrying such
information, which participate in a grand conversation where the different cognitive participators, at differ-
ent organizational levels, constantly exchange streams of meaningful information. So, following Wheeler’s
desiderata to synthesize the central point of quantum theory (and, we also add, of relativity theory) in a
simple and concise statement that anyone could understand, we believe that such statement might be: the
stuff the world is made of is conceptual.
To conclude, it is important to note that the conceptuality interpretation also contains an explanation
that would make our physical reality intelligible again to human pre-scientific intuition and thinking. This
certainly distinguishes it from all the other interpretations, and also confers to it a highly speculative
character, at least at the present state of our investigation. In that respect, it is important to mention
again how crucial it is not to confuse the human conceptual realm with the conceptuality that would
be inherent in our physical world. In pre-scientific times, in order to make sense of the physical entities
and associated phenomena, we humans tried to psychologize them, conferring them human-like mental
attributes, motivations and behaviors. According to the conceptuality interpretation, by doing so we
committed a serious mistake, but at the same time we also accessed a deep insight about the physical
world. The deep insight is the recognition that the latter would share with our human cultural world a
same conceptual/cognitive nature; the serious mistake is about believing that physical entities and human
28The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences [58] becomes all of a sudden less unreasonable
if we consider that mathematics is first of all a sophisticated conceptual language and that physical entities interact in a
language-mediated conceptual way.
29We cannot combine cubic meters to build a house, although its volumetric properties can certainly be expressed in such
units.
41
cognitive/conceptual entities would exchange the same kind of meaning. This is the same kind of mistake
we committed when we believed that planet Earth was fixed at the center of the universe, which was then
reduced to a mere celestial sphere with the stars attached to it. When we escaped this “Ptolemaic cave,”
following the Copernican revolution, we accessed an incredibly wider and richer universe. Similarly, by
escaping the “cave of our human-centered worldview,” following the “conceptuality revolution” (if it will
turn out to be such), we might also access an incredibly deeper and richer reality, requiring us to learn not
only new languages, but also the non-human semantics attached to them.
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